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Foreword by the Director-General
2013 has been a watershed year for the OPCW and for the international regime against chemical weapons. Tragically, it saw the first confirmed 
use of such weapons for over 25 years causing a large 
number of deaths and injuries. As I stated at the time, 
“Any use of chemical weapons is abhorrent and stands 
fully condemned by the international community as 
embodied in the Chemical Weapons Convention and 
underlined in its near universal acceptance.”
The use of chemical weapons in 
Syria also set in motion a chain of 
diplomatic activity which resulted 
in that country’s accession to 
the Convention on 14 October, 
thus becoming our 190th State 
Party. The strong action taken 
by the international community 
in reaction to the use of chemical 
weapons has presented the 
OPCW with the biggest challenge 
in our 16-year history. However, 
it also presents the opportunity 
to demonstrate that effective 
multilateralism and international 
cooperation can be brought to 
bear on even the most difficult of 
situations.
I was deeply honoured to recently 
accept the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of the 
OPCW. The award recognises the “extensive efforts” 
of the OPCW to eliminate chemical weapons. While the 
elimination of Syrian chemical weapons is the current 
and most visible demonstration of these efforts, the real 
success has been the verified destruction of over 80 
percent of the world’s chemical weapons. Destruction 
of all the world’s chemical weapons is a goal which is 
rapidly coming within our grasp.
This issue of OPCW Today is devoted to education, 
outreach and awareness-raising. Clearly, events in 
Syria and the award of the Nobel Peace Prize have 
increased awareness about the OPCW and the 
Convention to an extent hardly imaginable by the 
Secretariat. A key objective now will be sustaining this 
awareness and turning it into ongoing support for the 
OPCW and for securing the peaceful uses of chemistry 
into the future. In my statement to the 74th session of 
the Executive Council, I proposed that 2014 should be 
a year of awareness-raising on the Convention.
In this issue, I am pleased to see contributions 
from many practitioners and eminent experts in the 
field. The authors range from those involved with 
teaching chemistry in high schools, through university 
professors, academic experts and members of National 
Authorities. In their contributions, they give practical 
examples of tools, materials and approaches for raising 
awareness about the Convention and for incorporating 
it into education and outreach programmes. For those 
of us in international organisations, or for most National 
Authorities, such ideas should be of great utility as we 
reach out to stakeholder groups beyond those with 
which we are used to interacting.
The range of contributions 
included in this issue also 
highlights the importance 
of involving a wide range 
of stakeholders in the 
implementation of the 
Convention. Many of the actions 
necessary to raise awareness 
about the Convention are 
those which the OPCW cannot 
take alone, or for which it 
is not suitably equipped or 
funded. Therefore, activities 
in this field must be based 
upon a partnership approach, 
as demonstrated for example 
by our strong relationship with 
the International Union of Pure 
and Applied Chemistry.
I would finally like to reflect that, as a treaty organisation 
grounded in science, it is important for us in the OPCW 
to promote the concept of “responsible science”. 
Chemistry is a wonderful science which has done, and 
will continue to do much good for humanity. Chemistry 
has a vital role to play in the sustainable development 
agenda and in our joint efforts to address such global 
challenges as climate change. However, as with any 
science, there is the possibility that chemistry may 
be misused as it has been in the past. All those in 
relevant positions, not only chemists, must be aware 
of the responsibility to promote the peaceful uses of 
chemistry. 
Only with a focus on the long-term and on the education 
of and outreach to future generations will we come 
closer to our common goal of a world free of chemical 
weapons.
Ahmet Üzümcü
OPCW Director-General
“The strong action taken by the in-
ternational community in reaction to 
the use of  chemical weapons has pre-
sented the OPCW with the biggest 
challenge in our 16-year history.”
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The Nobel Peace Prize for 2013
The decision by the Nobel Committee to bestow this year’s Peace Prize on the OPCW is a great honour for our Organisation.
We are a small organisation which for over 16 years, and 
away from the glare of international publicity, has shouldered 
an onerous but noble task – to act as the guardian of the 
global ban on chemical weapons that took effect in 1997.
That year, a hundred-year effort was crowned with success as 
the Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force.
Our organization was tasked to verify the elimination of 
chemical weapons from the world and to encourage all 
nations to adhere to this hard-earned norm. 
We have since then worked with quiet determination to rid the 
world of these heinous weapons – weapons which have been 
used	to	horrifi	c	effect	throughout	the	twentieth	century,	and,	
sadly, in our own time too.
Events in Syria have been a tragic reminder that there remains 
much work yet to be done. Our hearts go out to the Syrian 
people who were recently victims of the horror of chemical 
weapons.
Today we are engaged in work which is meant to ensure that 
this atrocity is not repeated.
Never in the history of our organisation have we been 
called on to verify a destruction program within such short 
timeframes	–	and	in	an	ongoing	confl	ict.
We are conscious of the enormous trust that the 
international community has bestowed on us.
Working to realize the vision of a world free of chemical 
weapons, we rely on the expertise, professionalism and 
dedication of our staff – qualities that have been forged 
through a solid record of achievement.
This would clearly not be possible without the steadfast 
support and commitment of our States Parties.
The recognition that the Peace Prize brings will spur us 
to untiring effort, even stronger commitment and greater 
dedication.
I truly hope that this award, and the OPCW’s ongoing 
mission together with the United Nations in Syria, will 
help broader efforts to achieve peace in that country 
and end the suffering of its people.
I take this opportunity to commend all those who have 
contributed to making the ban on chemical weapons an 
enduring and universal norm.
I look forward to accepting this award in humility and in 
recognition of the professionalism of our staff, both past 
and present, and the strong support we have received 
from our States Parties.
Ahmet Üzümcü
Director-General
11 October 2013
OPCW Today
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Working Together for a World Free of 
Chemical Weapons, and Beyond
Your Majesties,
Distinguished members of the Norwegian Nobel 
Committee,
Excellencies,
Ladies and gentlemen,
It is with profound humility that I accept this prize on 
behalf of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons, its Member States, their Ambassadors and 
Secretariat staff, past and present – some of whom are 
with us today, including my immediate predecessor, 
Ambassador	Rogelio	Pfirter.
This award recognises our combined efforts.
Efforts	which	flow	from	the	collective	spirit	of	the	OPCW	in	
working towards a common good that serves all humanity.
I feel deeply privileged to be able to address you on this 
occasion.
I also take this opportunity to honour the memory of Nelson 
Mandela.
He will remain, for all of us and future generations, a 
beacon for what can be achieved against overwhelming 
odds to advance peace, dignity and reconciliation. 
********************
The Nobel Committee has a long history of honouring 
achievement in disarmament.
Yet,	 this	 is	 the	 first	 time	 that	 the	Peace	Prize	 has	 been	
awarded to an organisation that is actively engaged in 
disarmament as a practical and ongoing reality.
For sixteen years now, the OPCW has been overseeing 
the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass 
destruction.
Our task is to consign chemical weapons to history, forever.
A task we have been carrying out with quiet determination, 
and no small measure of success.
Under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
the	OPCW	has	so	far	verified	the	destruction	of	more	than	
80% of all declared chemical weapons.
We have also implemented a wide range of measures to 
prevent such weapons from re-emerging.
And with 190 states now members of this global ban, 
we are hastening the vision of a world free of chemical 
weapons to reality.
The remarkable success of chemical disarmament has 
born out the promise made by Nobel Peace Prize laureate 
and	 former	UN	Secretary-General	 Kofi	Annan,	when	 he	
characterised	the	first	meeting	of	Member	States,	back	in	
1997, with the following words:
“It is not merely a great step in the cause of disarmament 
and non-proliferation.  It is not merely a signal of restraint 
and discipline in war.  It is much more.  It is a momentous 
act of peace.”
********************
Excellencies,
Ladies and gentlemen,
There can be no doubt about the value of this work.
For chemical weapons have been used with brutal 
regularity over the twentieth century – and, tragically, in 
this century as well.
No weapon, of course, has a monopoly on cruelty or 
lethality.
But chemical weapons have, by any measure, an especially 
nefarious legacy.
Almost	 one	 hundred	 years	 since	 their	 first	 large-scale	
use	on	 the	battlefields	of	Flanders,	 it	 is	worth	 reminding	
ourselves of the reasons why these weapons invoke such 
horror, right up to our own time.
Chemical weapons stir the deep-rooted and pathological 
fear all humans share of being poisoned.
They do not discriminate between combatant and civilian, 
nor	between	battlefield	and	village.
You cannot see them.
You cannot smell them.
2013 Nobel Peace Prize Lecture
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And they offer no warning for the unsuspecting.
But their effects are devastating – burning, blinding or 
suffocating their victims.
Death is rarely instant and never painless.
And when they fail to kill, as they often do, these weapons 
inflict	 lasting	 damage	 on	 people	 and	 their	 environment,	
denying them the opportunity to repair and rebuild in the 
wake	of	conflict.
I need not describe 
these effects in all their 
gruesome variations. 
They would defy any 
description.
It is enough to look at 
the pictures of victims 
to understand the 
agony that they must 
have gone through – 
from Ieper in Belgium 
to Sardasht in Iran, 
from Halabja in Iraq to 
Ghouta in Syria.
And we only need 
to look at the fate of 
the survivors of such 
attacks – people destined to spend the rest of their lives 
suffering unbearable physical and psychological pain – to 
understand why such weapons must be banned.
Chemical weapons evolved over time, with the discovery 
of new and deadlier agents.
But, whatever their form, they share one common purpose 
– to invoke fear and submission through the horrifying 
nature of their impact.
Scores	of	victims	beyond	the	battlefield	have	attested	to	
this.
In accepting this prize on behalf of the OPCW, I also pay 
homage to all these victims.
********************
The	 first	 attempt	 to	 ban	 the	 use	 of	 chemical	 weapons	
under international law was the Hague Convention of 
1899.
The fact that this treaty was not observed during the 
First World War prompted immediate efforts to negotiate 
a stronger norm.  These efforts resulted in the 1925 
Geneva Protocol.
While it prohibited the use of chemical weapons, the 
Protocol did not ban their production or possession.
History, alas, did not bear out its robustness.
Chemical weapons continued to be used across the globe, 
including against civilian populations.  And, alarmingly, 
large and more sophisticated arsenals were developed 
during the Cold War.
It was not until the 1980s 
that negotiations for a 
more comprehensive 
chemical weapons 
treaty got underway 
in earnest.  Chemical 
attacks being 
perpetrated at that time 
by the former regime 
in Iraq added to the 
urgency of this process.
Fortunately, it was not 
only the brutal effects of 
chemical weapons that 
focused minds.
What drove the 
negotiators was also 
the imperative to ensure 
the effectiveness of the future norm to ban these weapons.
States were adamant that chemical weapons had to be 
made a thing of the past – by deeds, not just words.
What they strove for was a treaty that all but enforced 
compliance, coming closer than any predecessor to 
guaranteeing adherence to its provisions.
And,	 after	 almost	 two	 decades	 of	 difficult	 negotiations,	
they succeeded.
Their efforts gave birth to the full global ban that came to 
be known as the Chemical Weapons Convention.
And to an entirely independent organisation, the OPCW, to 
oversee its implementation.
********************
As	difficult	as	the	challenges	in	bilateral	arms	control	have	
been, concluding this multilateral treaty was, clearly, a 
singular achievement.
It also stands as a major triumph in the history of 
multilateralism.
OPCW Today
Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü delivers the Nobel Peace Prize Lecture 
on 10 December 2013. © Ken Opprann / Nobel Foundation 2013
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Almost	 eighty	 years	 after	 the	 first	 large-scale	 use	 of	
chemical weapons, the collective determination of states 
was	 finally	 able	 to	 shine	 through	 in	 comprehensively	
banning these weapons.
This resolve of the community of nations lays testimony to 
the very best that can be achieved by multilateralism in the 
cause of peace and security.
As Benjamin Disraeli observed, “Through perseverance, 
many people win success out of what seemed destined to 
be certain failure.”
I pay tribute here to all those who, through their dedication 
and resolve, contributed to this hard-won success for 
chemical disarmament.
And I commend Governments for 
their courage and foresight in taking 
this bold step.
 
********************
It was out of these negotiations that 
the crucible of the unique success of 
the Chemical Weapons Convention 
was forged – a comprehensive 
international	verification	mechanism.
A mechanism that had no prior model 
and had to be developed from scratch.
A mechanism that obliges every one of the Convention’s 
190 Member States, without discrimination, to destroy its 
chemical weapon stocks and production facilities.
And to lay bare, through inspection, any industrial facilities 
that could be used for purposes prohibited by this treaty.
A mechanism that brooks no exceptions, and can conduct 
inspections at short notice to investigate alleged use of 
chemical weapons, or suspicions over banned activities.
In short, a mechanism that places the onus on states to 
ensure full transparency vis-à-vis their obligations – with 
the OPCW acting as arbiter and guardian of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention.
With the entry into force of the Convention in 1997, we 
have thus been able to cross, and link, the wide space in 
disarmament between passion and practicality, between 
sentiment and action, between noble ambition and 
concrete achievements.
And,	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 the	 history	 of	 multilateral	
diplomacy, we were able to show that consensus-based 
decision-making can yield practical, effective and, above 
all,	verifiable	results	in	disarmament.
From where we stand now, I commend Member States’ 
commitment to effective implementation of the Convention.
********************
 
The Convention’s achievements make the recent chemical 
attacks in Syria, which shocked us all, even more tragic.
For they highlight the manifest security advantages that 
states adhering to the Convention enjoy.
In the sixteen years that the Convention has been in force, 
no Member State has experienced an attack with chemical 
weapons.
Thankfully, the international response to those attacks 
set in motion an extraordinary series of 
events.
These resulted in Syria’s accession 
to the Convention and a front-line role 
for the OPCW, working together with 
the United Nations, to eliminate Syrian 
chemical weapons.
Never in its history has the OPCW 
overseen the destruction of such a major 
chemical weapons stockpile in the midst 
of a civil war, and in such compressed 
timeframes.
But, as much as this mission is testing our capacities and 
resources, our progress so far has only strengthened our 
confidence	that	we	can	succeed.
I am immensely proud of those staff members, from the 
OPCW as well as the UN, who have volunteered to work 
in Syria in what are extremely challenging circumstances.
Their dedication and personal courage do great credit to 
both organisations.
********************
Excellencies,
Ladies and gentlemen,
International consensus on the elimination of Syria’s 
chemical weapons has as its basis the same consensus 
that drove the Chemical Weapons Convention to 
conclusion.
The challenge now is to persuade those six countries 
still outside the Convention to join it – without delay or 
conditions.
There has long been no reasonable defence for not doing 
so – all the more now in the wake of the robust international 
OPCW Today
“We only need to look at 
the fate of  the survivors of  
[chemical weapon attacks]  – 
people destined to spend the 
rest of  their lives suffering 
unbearable physical and  
psychological pain – to  
understand why such weapons 
must be banned.”
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reaction to recent use of chemical weapons.
No national interest can credibly outweigh either the 
security	 or	 economic	 benefits	 of	 adhering	 to	 the	 global	
chemical ban.
It is my fervent hope that this award will spur on efforts to 
make the Chemical Weapons Convention a truly universal 
norm.
Universal adherence to the Convention would be the 
most enduring investment in its integrity – and the best 
guarantee of its reach.
We cannot allow the tragedy that befell the people of 
Ghouta to be repeated.
********************
The durability of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention owes as much to what 
followed in the implementation of the 
treaty as to what was negotiated into it.
Key in this regard are the OPCW’s 
active partnerships with science.
These	partnerships	have	 in	significant	
measure	 defined	 the	 success	 of	 the	
Convention because of the dual-use nature of what goes 
into making chemical weapons.
Many of their materials and technologies also have 
beneficial	commercial	and	industrial	applications.
Without a common understanding of where the line must 
be drawn between what helps us, and what harms us, 
there	can	be	no	effective	verification.
It is the OPCW’s partnerships with science that have drawn 
this line – in a clear and defensible way.
They have done so by devising tools and methods for 
defining,	detecting	and	protecting	against	chemical	weapon	
agents, and monitoring new and emerging technologies of 
potential concern.
More than this, they have facilitated the sharing of such 
information between peers.
And, crucially, they have opened up a new sort of dialogue 
that	 makes	 the	 impact	 of	 scientific	 discoveries	 better	
understood.
We need to deal with the situation in which, as Isaac 
Asimov put it, “science gathers knowledge faster than 
society gathers wisdom.”
It is for this reason that the OPCW has worked hard 
to	 enhance	 awareness	 of	 the	 often	 fine	 line	 between	
beneficial	 and	 harmful	 applications	 in	 chemistry	 through	
education programmes and outreach to academia.
Our aim is to contribute to efforts towards fostering a 
culture of responsible science.
This will ensure that current and future generations of 
scientists understand – and respect – the impact that their 
work can have on security.
What we are striving to create, together with our partners, 
is a two-tiered structure for supporting advances in 
chemistry.
One that accommodates a collective early-warning system 
for	 scientific	discoveries	 that	 could	be	
misused, and a global repository for 
knowledge, expertise and technologies 
that	should	benefit	all	nations.
********************
Industry has been no less important a 
partner for the achievement of goals 
enshrined in the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.
Its concerns were discussed and 
addressed from the very beginning of the negotiations on 
the Convention.
Specifically,	 industry	had	to	have	complete	confidence	in	
arrangements made for commercial protection.
Without such arrangements, there could be no productive 
collaboration and, therefore, no access to commercial 
chemical facilities for inspection.
Given	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 the	 Convention’s	 verification	
requirements are entangled with normal commercial and 
industrial processes, industry’s active participation is vital.
Some 2,500 inspections later, in more than 80 countries, 
we have shown that the Convention’s arrangements work.
Our ambition now is to better integrate industry as a partner 
working to ensure continued and effective implementation 
of the Convention.
More broadly, this sort of partnership with the private 
sector points a way forward for many of the non-traditional 
multilateral challenges we are facing, from climate change 
to poverty alleviation.
It is a key area of focus for the OPCW’s efforts to augment 
the	Convention’s	profile,	and	adherence	to	it.	
********************
“Never in its history has 
the OPCW overseen the 
destruction of  such a major 
chemical weapons stockpile 
in the midst of  a civil war, 
and in such compressed 
timeframes.”
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When the Chemical Weapons Convention was concluded 
in 1992, it was rightly heralded as the most tangible 
disarmament outcome of the immediate post-Cold War 
period.
But over the more than two decades since then, we have 
little else to show in the area of disarmament for the 
enormous peace dividend that the end of the Cold War 
brought us.
It is high time to move towards a different, more durable 
security in keeping with the extraordinary opportunities 
that globalisation has brought.
A security that accommodates human development, 
economic cooperation and mutual prosperity.
Effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention	has	played	a	definitive	role	 in	empowering	a	
broader community of stakeholders to this end.
Their voices are persuasive because they are pragmatic.
They eschew moral argument in favour of facts.
And their modes of presentation only enhance their 
credibility.  
These	 include:	 objective	 assessments	 of	 verification	
methods,	 innovative	 cost-benefit	 analyses	 of	 retaining	
weapons of mass destruction, and frank reviews of the 
commercial impact of treaty compliance.
Finally, they have been able to give expression to their 
voices and test their judgements through new habits of 
dialogue and cooperation between scientists and policy-
makers, between industry and academia, and between 
civil	society	and	government	officials.
It is these sorts of habits that the OPCW is committed to 
fostering.
As a means of preserving the legacy of the 2013 Nobel 
Peace Prize, I announce here that the prize money 
awarded by the Nobel Committee will be used to fund 
annual OPCW awards.
These awards will recognise outstanding contributions to 
advancing the goals of the Convention.
I am sure that along with other stakeholders the civil 
society	will	continue	to	play	a	significant	role	in	this	regard.
********************
For its part, the OPCW will do its utmost to remain a highly 
effective organisation.
An organisation that continues to invest in its most valuable 
asset – a cadre of highly skilled and dedicated people.
An organisation that anticipates future challenges.
And an organisation that adapts its resources and expertise to 
be able to respond to them.
Syria has tested us in this regard.
Verifying the declaration of a Member State is a routine activity 
for the OPCW.  But there is clearly nothing routine about the 
circumstances in which we are doing so in that country.
We would welcome the opportunity of new Member States 
submitting	 themselves	 to	 the	 verification	 regime	 of	 the	
Convention.
At the same time, we are looking beyond what we do, to how 
we do it.
Our aim is to build on our sixteen-year record of success 
by	increasing	our	efficiency	and	broadening	our	reach.
This	 not	 only	 means	 staying	 abreast	 of	 scientific	 and	
technological advances that may test our understanding of 
what constitutes a chemical weapon.
It also requires us to ensure that we are making the best 
possible use of advances in communication, especially 
publicly available tools.
Having seen how rapidly information can be conveyed by 
social	 media	 and,	 critically,	 verified	 through	 images,	 we	
need to consider how we might harness such tools for our 
monitoring,	verification	and	investigation	activities.
This could render particular benefits for our work with 
Member States to prevent non-state actors from gaining 
access to dual-use materials and know-how.
And, in our world of globalised trade and supply chains, 
it could potentially help Member States further improve 
their ability to track exports of dual-use goods and 
materials, to ensure that these goods go where they 
are supposed to go, and are used for purposes they are 
intended to be used for.
We are also thinking about how we can employ new 
communication tools to raise awareness of the need to 
practise responsible science, to instil the highest ethical 
standards in our future scientists and researchers.
Finally, we are expanding and deepening our interaction 
with other international organisations.
The United Nations is central in this regard, whether in 
partnership on the ground in Syria, or in our broader, 
OPCW Today
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mutually reinforcing efforts to promote disarmament.
We are likewise engaging regional organisations to use 
their forums and networks for raising awareness of the 
goals of the Chemical Weapons Convention, including 
in helping to secure universality.
Our interaction with other specialised international agencies 
is usefully identifying areas of overlap that enhance chemical 
security, ranging from addressing transnational crime and 
terrorism, to building capacity for chemical emergency 
response.
And we are working with other arms control treaty organisations 
to exchange best practices in areas ranging from dual-use 
challenges	to	verification	methods.
Institutional cooperation is the bedrock of the broader 
stakeholder engagement on which the OPCW prides itself.
Cooperation which I hope we can underwrite with increased 
communication and social networking, stimulating fresh ideas 
and innovative inputs.
 
********************
Your Majesties,
Distinguished members of the Norwegian Nobel 
Committee,
Excellencies,
Ladies and gentlemen,
The history of arms control has shown no lack of passion.
Yet, when so much is at stake, passion must take care to 
ground itself in reality, if it is to achieve its ambitions.
This means being pragmatic, clear-minded – even 
dispassionate – about acquiring the best possible tools for 
achieving and consolidating disarmament goals.
And it often means governments showing the political 
courage	 to	 take	 tough	 decisions	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	
community of nations.
The Chemical Weapons Convention has shown that this 
sort of an approach yields results.
For the Convention is more than mere words and promises 
on a piece of paper.
It is a comprehensive regime geared towards ridding the 
world of chemical weapons, and making sure they never 
again threaten humankind.
In this regime, member states provide the will behind the 
Convention.
And it is the OPCW that provides the force for making its 
goals a reality.
Our work, imbued with resolve and certitude, is the 
international community’s guarantee of the Convention’s 
implementation.
It shows that from lofty dreams we can carve out steps 
leading us from vision to reality.
It took almost a century to achieve a total ban on 
chemical weapons.
A century over which thousands fell victim to these 
heinous weapons.
A century at whose end we can now look to a future 
free of the scourge they represent.
No value can be placed on this achievement.
And no effort should be spared in sharing the gains it 
has brought us.
Those of us who have worked towards chemical 
disarmament recognise that with our success also 
comes an obligation to broaden it.
The Chemical Weapons Convention has given us a 
legacy that no future disarmament effort can afford to 
ignore.
A legacy that has, at its core, verification, broad 
stakeholder engagement, consensus born of trust and, 
above all, a commitment to science that actively serves 
the cause of peace and security.
It is this legacy that we must set as the keystone in an 
ever-widening arch of disarmament.
Only by building such an arch will we be able to bridge 
our security and our prosperity. 
Destiny has ruled that we rid the world of chemical 
weapons.
And that we achieve this in our lifetime. 
This is our place in history.
And this is the future we are creating. 
A future for which our children and grandchildren can 
be truly thankful.
OPCW Today
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During the Third Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention in April 2013, States Parties to the Convention gave a 
strong mandate to the OPCW to undertake activities 
in	 the	 fields	 of	 education,	 outreach	 and	 awareness-
raising. In the Political Declaration agreed at the 
Review Conference, States Parties underlined their 
determination to “maintain the Convention’s role as 
a bulwark against chemical weapons; to that end 
to promote, inter alia, outreach, capacity building, 
education and public diplomacy.” 
In accordance with this, and specific recommendations 
from the States Parties’ review of the operation of the 
Convention, the Secretariat has already undertaken a 
range of activities during 2013 and will further enhance 
such activities in 2014, particularly in light of the 
centenary in that year of the outbreak of the First World 
War, and the centenary in 2105 of the first large-scale 
use of chemical weapons.
In its activities, the Secretariat is guided by the advice 
that it receives from the Scientific Advisory Board 
(SAB), particularly from its Temporary Working Group 
on Education and Outreach in Science and Technology 
Relevant to the Convention. The Group, comprising of 13 
international experts on the Convention and chemistry 
education, is chaired by Professor Djafer Benachour of 
Algeria and has recently concluded its third meeting. 
The Group is an extremely valuable source of guidance 
and advice for the Secretariat, particularly with regard 
to recommendations for sustainable approaches to 
education and outreach in the long term.
Objectives  
Awareness of the Convention is, of course, high among 
those most directly involved in its implementation. 
However, it remains low among other communities, for 
such as practising chemists, those trading, transporting 
and otherwise handling chemicals, those responsible 
for regulating chemicals, and chemistry educators and 
students. These communities should have a higher 
level of awareness given the knowledge and expertise 
they possess and their access to toxic chemicals. 
A higher level of awareness among such groups will help to 
ensure that their members do not inadvertently contribute 
to the re-emergence of chemical weapons or chemicals 
being used for purposes prohibited under the Convention. 
Sixteen years after the entry into force of the Convention, 
a more systematic approach to this issue should be 
introduced. The objectives of such an effort would include:
•	 Significantly	 increasing	 the	 level	 of	 awareness,	
particularly	 among	 the	 scientific	 and	 academic	
communities, about the Convention and its prohibitions, 
which will in turn contribute to its full and effective 
implementation;
•	 Developing	more	 specific	education	and	 training	
materials for current and future chemists, chemical 
engineers and others; 
•	 Organising a series of regional meetings to 
sensitise the relevant communities to the issue, to 
catalyse regional networking, to share best practices 
and to exchange information;
•	 Providing tools for National Authorities to assist 
them in effective national outreach to the relevant 
communities; and
•	 Building sustainable relationships with other 
national, regional and international actors in the areas 
of responsible science, the peaceful uses of chemistry 
and disarmament education.
Possible approaches
In concert with the SAB’s Temporary Working Group on 
Education and Outreach and several States Parties, the 
Secretariat	has	 identified	certain	approaches	 that	could	
be explored by States Parties in their outreach efforts to 
national	 scientific	 and	 academic	 communities.	 National	
Authorities could partner with appropriate national 
agencies, for example ministries of education or science 
and technology, or with research councils or academic 
funding bodies. Frequently such national bodies have 
well-developed	 links	 with	 the	 academic	 and	 scientific	
communities and conduct regular outreach activities 
during which issues related to the Convention could be 
raised. The article in this issue by Gustavo Zlauvinen 
provides a good example of such partnership in Argentina.
OPCW Today
Education, outreach and  
awareness-raising after the 
Third Review Conference
By Djafer Benachour and Daniel Feakes 
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In general, the advice received from the Temporary 
Working Group is that the Convention should be introduced 
to	chemists	and	those	in	related	fields	within	the	broader	
context of “responsible science”. Many modern chemistry 
curricula are already very crowded and it is not realistic 
to	expect	educators	to	be	able	to	make	space	for	specific	
courses on the Convention. However, many curricula 
already require students to study the responsible conduct 
of science, and issues relating to the Convention and the 
OPCW could be incorporated into these existing courses. 
Such an approach may be more effective than promoting 
tailored courses on the Convention. Of course, where 
necessary	and	appropriate,	more	specific	education	and	
training can follow.
National	 Authorities	 in	 some	 States	 Parties	 may	 find	
the need to raise awareness among communities with 
which they do not have regular contact challenging, 
so this special issue of 
OPCW Today presents 
some practical examples of 
existing approaches, tools 
and materials that National 
Authorities can provide to 
educational institutions and 
scientific	associations.	
Following up the 
Review Conference 
recommendations
The	final	report	of	 the	Third	
Review Conference sets 
forth four recommendations 
specifically	 on	 education,	
outreach and awareness-
raising. The following paragraphs summarise activities 
undertaken in follow-up of each recommendation.
“… Encouraged the Secretariat, in concert with the SAB 
temporary working group on education and outreach, 
to assist States Parties, upon request, in implementing 
education and outreach activities, including by 
disseminating materials, conducting workshops and 
regional meetings.” (paragraph 9.103(e))
The Secretariat has already begun to support the 
development of educational materials. Such materials will 
be made available on the OPCW public website, but more 
tailored assistance could also be provided on request. 
Much wider dissemination of such material is planned, as 
is	 its	 translation	 into	all	 official	OPCW	 languages	during	
the course of 2014. The Secretariat will also seek voluntary 
funding to establish a global network of educators for the 
exchange of information and best practices and also to 
facilitate “train-the-trainer” programmes at the national or 
regional level. The Fifteenth Annual Meeting of National 
Authorities in November 2013 included the theme of 
education and outreach to encourage States Parties 
to share best practices and exchange information. The 
Secretariat is already supporting two projects to develop 
educational materials in concert with the Temporary 
Working Group (see the articles in this issue by Ludo 
Juurlink and Peter Mahaffy and Alastair Hay) and also 
supported a pilot “train-the-trainer” workshop in Argentina 
(see the article in this issue by Alejandra Suarez and 
Rolando Spanevello).
“…. Encouraged the Secretariat to continue to develop 
relationships and partnerships with other relevant bodies, 
national and international, that are working to promote 
the peaceful and responsible use of chemistry, including 
capacity building.” (paragraph 9.131(j))
The	 Secretariat	 already	 benefits	 from	 valuable	
relationships and partnerships in this area, most notably 
with the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry 
(IUPAC). In 2012, the Director-
General gave a keynote speech 
at IUPAC’s International 
Conference on Chemistry 
Education in Rome and again 
(via video) at the IUPAC World 
Chemistry Congress in Istanbul 
in 2013.
However, this existing 
partnership is being 
broadened and deepened, and 
partnerships with other such 
organisations, for example 
the International Council for 
Science (ICSU) and the United 
Nations Education, Cultural 
and	 Scientific	 Organisation	
(UNESCO), are being established. 
Such partnerships could take the form of, inter alia, the 
joint organisation of meetings on relevant topics and the 
reciprocal participation in meetings and conferences of 
each organisation, joint awareness-raising and outreach 
activities, and coordinated dissemination of educational 
materials. A member of the SAB participated in the recent 
World Science Forum in Brazil, the declaration of which 
stated that “scientists are individually and collectively 
ethically responsible for the advancement of Science and 
the	use	of	its	benefits	for	society.”
“… Encouraged the Secretariat to continue to develop 
relations and partnerships as appropriate with relevant 
regional and international organisations, as well as 
chemical industry associations, the private sector, 
academia, and civil society, in order to raise awareness of 
the activities of the OPCW” (paragraph 9.131(l))
The Secretariat will continue its existing relationship 
with	 the	 United	 Nations	 Office	 for	 Disarmament	 Affairs	
and will provide OPCW information and material for 
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon addresses 
the Third Review Conference in April 2013
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use by UNODA’s disarmament education programme. 
Strengthened activities by the Secretariat in this area also 
contribute to the implementation of the recommendations 
contained in the 2002 report of the Secretary-General’s 
group of experts on disarmament and non-proliferation 
education (A/57/124). As appropriate, the Secretariat will 
share experiences and best practices with other relevant 
international bodies and organisations, particularly the 
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, the World Health Organization, and the 
Implementation Support Unit of the Biological Weapons 
Convention. A meeting bringing together many of these 
organisations took place in November 2013 (see the 
article in this issue by Elena Sokova and Daniel Feakes). 
“…. Called upon States Parties and the Secretariat, 
as part of efforts to promote the ethical norms of the 
Convention, to encourage and promote efforts by the 
appropriate national and international professional bodies 
to inculcate awareness amongst scientists and engineers 
at an early stage in their training that the knowledge and 
technologies used for beneficial purposes should only be 
used for purposes not prohibited under this Convention” 
(paragraph 9.155(d))
As mentioned above, the Secretariat has collaborated 
with IUPAC for many years, including on the development 
of educational materials on the multiple uses of chemicals 
and on guidelines for codes of conduct. The Secretariat 
has also worked with national professional bodies and 
academies of science in many States Parties in order 
to generate awareness of the potential risks posed by 
toxic chemicals. The Secretariat intends to intensify 
such efforts and encourages States Parties to involve 
such bodies in any national education and outreach 
activities. The Secretariat will also initiate relations with 
relevant regional and international bodies such as the 
InterAcademy Council.
 
Conclusions
The Director-General will continue to report to States 
Parties on the implementation of the Review Conference’s 
recommendations, and encourages active contributions from 
States Parties in a position to do so. This issue of OPCW 
Today is devoted to the subject of education and outreach and 
includes information on ongoing Secretariat activities as well 
as contributions from other bodies and organisations. 
With	 the	 unique	 confluence	 of	 events	 presented	 by	 the	
2013 Nobel Peace Prize, the centenary of the First World 
War,	and	 the	approaching	centenary	of	 the	first	 large-scale	
use of chemical weapons, the OPCW has an unparalleled 
opportunity to reach out beyond its traditional audiences and 
to ensure that the peaceful and responsible use of chemistry 
is inculcated in future generations.
Daniel Feakes is the Strategy and Policy Adviser in the Office 
of Strategy and Policy at the OPCW. In 2009, Daniel joined 
the OPCW as a Senior Policy Officer within the Verification 
Division of the Technical Secretariat. From 1997-2009 Daniel 
worked at the Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and 
Biological Weapons (HSP) at the University of Sussex and 
in The Hague. With HSP he studied developments relating to 
both the CWC and the BWC, undertook numerous research 
projects and published widely. Daniel is the Secretary to 
the OPCW Temporary Working Group on Education and 
Outreach in Science and Technology Relevant to the Chemical 
Weapons Convention.
Djafer Benachour is Director of the research laboratory 
on “Multiphase Polymeric Materials” since July 2000 at the 
Ferhat ABBAS University of the Ministry of Higher Education 
and Scientific Research, Setif, Algeria. He was also Vice-
president of the Algerian Chemical Society from 1991 to 2009. 
He is currently President of the Scientific Committee of the 
Department of Chemical Engineering.  His areas of expertise 
are on industrial and engineering chemistry.
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In 2010, the Argentine National Authority launched a number of activities and projects, at national level, as part of the next stage in its implementation of 
the obligations of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC) in Argentina. Five working groups were 
established,	 aimed	 at	 specific	 areas	 that	 required	
further implementation. The groups included 
representatives from several ministries and federal 
agencies with direct responsibility in the targeted 
areas	 or	 fields,	 as	 well	 as	
representatives from the 
private sector, national 
chemical societies, civil 
society organisations, and 
scientific	groups.
One of the groups was 
assigned to work on 
outreach, in particular to 
devise innovative ways to 
identify and reach out to 
those companies that had not 
yet	 fulfilled	 their	 obligations	
under the Convention and 
the national legislation, i.e., 
to register with the National 
Authority and/or to submit 
correctly their annual declarations of activities. 
Like any other national system that controls listed chemical 
substances and the chemical industry in its territory, the 
Argentine system depends on actions by particular actors. 
For this reason it is impossible for the National Authority 
to know in advance the full range of individual companies 
that have the obligation to register and make declarations 
of their activities. However, there are certain indicators that 
point	to	the	efficiency	-	or	not	-		of	the	system.
Bearing that in mind, the working group conducted a 
comparative evaluation of the number of companies in 
Argentina that have declared their activities to the National 
Authority, vis-à-vis those registered in countries in the 
region with similar industrial developments and outputs. 
The study showed that the number of registered companies 
in Argentina was much lower than in comparable countries. 
Another study showed a systemic lack of correct 
understanding, among the companies´ owners, managers, 
and/or legal representatives, of the obligations under the 
CWC and the national laws and regulations. This study 
was	corroborated	by	the	field	experience	of	personnel	from	
the National Authority during inspections at the plants. For 
example, activities that ought to be declared were not, and 
activities that did not need to be were indeed declared.
A new outreach document was issued and distributed to the 
private sector through several Chambers or Associations 
of Industries. 
The document described the obligations, in simpler terms, 
and also provided examples of 
common misunderstandings 
by the companies. In addition, 
staff from the National 
Authority conducted outreach 
seminars and meetings with 
representatives of industries, 
by sector. New guidelines 
for the submission of the 
annual declarations were 
designed by the Ministry of 
Industry, with the approval 
of the National Authority. 
The new guidelines sought 
to get more information from 
the companies, while at the 
same time simplifying the 
process of submission. An 
electronic submission system for the annual declarations 
was developed and tested in a trial mode.
The activities conducted by the Argentine National Authority 
in	the	field	of	outreach	proved	to	be	very	successful	–	in	
just three years, the number of registered companies 
increased by 485%, and the number of declarable 
companies increased by 215%.
Nevertheless, during several inspections at facilities 
in Argentina, plant managers, production managers, 
and senior staff showed an incorrect or incomplete 
understanding of the technicalities related to the 
provisions of the CWC and the national norms. Although 
most managers held degrees in chemical engineering, 
chemistry or biochemistry, they claimed that they had 
not received adequate information about the legal 
norms and obligations under the CWC during their 
university studies. This was proof that, in addition to its 
outreach campaign to the private sector, the National 
Authority had to find other ways to improve the level of 
technical understanding by plant managers and senior 
staff.
The Argentine Project on  
Education and the CWC
By Gustavo Zlauvinen
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The opening ceremony of the national meeting on Education 
and the responsible use of scientific knowledge in the 
chemical fields, held in Buenos Aires on 7 May 2013.
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Consequently, the working group on outreach was asked 
to consider the question of education as another way 
of promoting the correct implementation of the CWC 
obligations in Argentina. The working group took into 
account the recommendations by the Advisory Panel 
on Future OPCW Priorities, as well as the work by the 
Temporary Working Group on Education and Outreach of 
the	Scientific	Advisory	Board	(SAB).	A	member	of	the	SAB,	
from Argentina, was invited to join the working group.
The working group analysed the Argentine university 
system, in particular the legal courses taught at graduate 
level that have a direct relationship to the obligations under 
the CWC. The group reached the conclusion that most of 
the graduate courses in chemistry, chemical engineering, 
biochemistry, pharmacy, environmental issues, and 
industrial security taught at Argentine public and private 
universities did not include the teaching of the national 
laws and regulations implementing the CWC obligations in 
Argentina. Therefore, the group proposed that the National 
Authority implement a project, in collaboration with the 
Ministry	of	Education,	to	promote	the	inclusion	of	specific	
courses in the curricula of these disciplines.
During its discussions, the group considered that the 
subject was too important to be limited to providing a 
better understanding of the obligations and norms of the 
CWC for future plant or production managers of declarable 
facilities. The group therefore proposed a broader scope 
for the project, with a view to promoting a culture of the 
responsible	 use	 of	 technical	 and	 scientific	 knowledge	
among	 all	 professionals	 in	 the	 chemical	 fields,	 in	 order	
to be aware of the potential danger and to prevent all 
misuse and abuse of chemicals. It was proposed that the 
project should also include practising chemists, research 
scientists, and university laboratory professionals. The 
group also considered that, at a second stage, the project 
should be targeted at students in secondary education.
The National Authority agreed with all the 
recommendations from the working group and decided 
to launch a national project to implement them. Taking 
into account the federal nature of the Argentine 
university system, the National Authority sought and 
got the support of the Ministry of Education. They 
agreed to work together in a project on education in the 
responsible	use	of	scientific	and	technical	knowledge	in	
the	chemical	fields.	To	that	end,	they	signed	a	strategic	
partnership agreement, setting the goals and actions 
required to implement the project.
For the project, over 150 faculties with graduate courses in 
chemistry, chemical engineering, biochemistry, pharmacy, 
environmental	 issues,	 and	 industrial	 were	 identified	 in	
Argentina. The respective associations of deans were 
contacted, and information about the project was sent to 
all deans through their channels of communication.
In May 2013, the National Authority and the Ministry 
of Education convened a national meeting to launch 
the project. Deans and heads of studies from over 
50 universities attended the meeting. All participants 
welcomed the initiative and recognised the need to 
include the teaching of the national norms relevant to 
the CWC in their respective graduate courses. However, 
as most vocational curricula were already crowded with 
regular courses, it was decided to leave it up to each 
university to decide how to include the new subjects. 
It was proposed that, where changing the curriculum 
was not possible or desirable, alternative educational 
tools should be devised to introduce the new subjects, 
such as workshops, seminars, optional courses, special 
assignments. Alternatively they could be incorporated 
into existing courses.
Since then, many other universities have expressed their 
intention	to	participate	in	the	project.	The	first	stage	of	the	
project, which started in July 2013, includes the following 
actions:
•	 The establishment of a network of universities, 
coordinated by the Ministry of Education and the 
National Authority, to help deans and heads of studies 
share their experiences, needs and recommendations 
on how to implement the project in their respective 
disciplines.
•	 The development of relevant course material to cover 
these topics, to be used by participant universities.
•	 The planning and running of a training programme 
for faculty members of participating universities, in 
particular chemistry professors.
•	 The development and implementation of a model 
virtual classroom, for those universities without trained 
faculty staff.
•	 The establishment of a “travelling class”, for those 
universities with no trained faculty staff or access to the 
virtual classroom.
Specific	 universities	 were	 appointed	 as	 coordinators	
of each course of action, in order to provide a sense of 
“ownership” of the initiatives. All activities in the project 
are implemented on a voluntary basis by the participating 
universities. 
Furthermore, the Ministry of Education has recently 
included, in its improvement programme for careers 
in	 chemistry,	 a	 specific,	 mandatory	 component	 on	
CWC obligations and national legislation. The new 
component is a requirement for those universities that, 
having	received	certification	for	their	chemistry	courses,	
intend to apply for funding support from the Ministry of 
Education. The Ministry of Education intends to include 
similar components as requirements in the improvement 
programmes of other relevant disciplines, such as 
chemical engineering. The Ministry of Education has 
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allocated funds to support universities´ activities in the 
implementation of the components.
Since the launch of the project, several universities 
have organised seminars and workshops on the 
subject, which were attended by a significant number 
of students and professors. The National Authority and 
the Ministry of Education gave presentations at those 
events, as well as at other meetings, such as the XVI 
Meeting of Argentine Professors of Chemistry, and 
the XVIII National Congress of Chemical Engineering 
Students.
The National Authority and the Ministry of Education will use 
specific	 indicators	 to	 measure	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	
project and the impact of its activities, both at the industry 
level, and at overall society level. They intend to release a 
report on the results by the end of 2014.
The Director-General of the OPCW has expressed his 
support to the Argentine project, as the Organisation is also 
increasing its work on education and outreach. The OPCW 
has contributed to the participation of external experts in the 
first	“train	the	trainers”	workshop	in	Argentina,	organised	by	
Universidad Nacional de Rosario. In addition, the Technical 
Secretariat has expressed its readiness to co-organise 
and	 support	 the	 first	 regional	 meeting	 on	 education	 and	
outreach, to be held in Buenos Aires in April 2014. At that 
meeting, the National Authority of Argentina intends to share 
the experience gained in implementing the national project 
with its counterparts in Latin America and the Caribbean.
As stated by the International Union of Pure and Applied 
Chemistry, “education, outreach, and awareness-raising 
are vital all over the world, and issues related to chemical 
weapons may be effectively embedded within a broader 
context of risk and messages about the responsible 
acquisition, use, and disposal of chemicals.” 
In that sense, National Authorities have a wider role to play, 
in addition to the crucial one given to them by the CWC. 
They are uniquely positioned to engage and interact with all 
stakeholders, at national and international levels, that have 
responsibilities, interests or obligations related to the use 
of toxic chemicals. When they work together, they produce 
synergies that help in achieving the goal of the CWC: a 
world free of chemical weapons, where toxic chemicals and 
their related technologies and knowledge are used in a safe 
manner,	exclusively	for	the	benefit	of	mankind.
From its own perspective, the National Authority of 
Argentina believes that its national project on education is 
a contribution to this goal, and hopes that the experience 
gained in its implementation could be of use to other National 
Authorities. In this regard, Argentina submitted a report on 
its activities to the eighteenth session of the Conference 
of the States Parties in November 2013 (see C-13/NAT.3, 
dated 2 December 2013).
Since May 2010, Mr. Zlauvinen has been the Executive 
Chairman of the National Authority of Argentina for the 
implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. From 
2001 to 2010 he was the Representative of the Director-
General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
to the United Nations in New York. In 2000 and 2001 Mr. 
Zlauvinen served in the Cabinet of the Argentine Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, in Buenos Aires. From 1995 to 1999 
he served as the Senior Political Adviser to the Executive 
Chairman of the UN Special Commission on the disarmament 
of Iraq (UNSCOM), in New York. From 1991 to 1995 he 
served in the Argentine Permanent Mission to the IAEA, in 
Vienna. Mr. Zlauvinen joined the Argentine Diplomatic Service 
in 1989.
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Human	 awareness	 is	 often	 the	 fi	rst	 line	 of	defence against a successful act of violence, whether it is spotting suspicious behaviour 
on-board an aeroplane or when seeing an unattended 
package at a transit terminal.  The same is true for 
thwarting any attempt to use chemicals to kill or maim 
others.  Changing practices to ensure that people 
watch for warning signs at a laboratory or industrial 
facility can prevent individuals with hostile intentions 
from exploiting security weaknesses to get the 
materials, technology, or 
information they need to 
carry out an attack. 
Ongoing disarmament and 
demilitarization of chemical 
weapons stockpiles means 
stealing chemical weapons 
will grow exceedingly 
diffi	cult,	which	will	increase	
the need for malicious 
actors to either make their 
own chemical weapons or 
use highly toxic industrial 
chemicals. 
That is one reason 
why Director-General 
Ahmet Üzümcü of the 
Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW) said that 
the OPCW needs to transition away from its emphasis on 
disarmament and demilitarization to other core elements 
of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)2.   
With the ongoing destruction of chemical weapons, 
this additional objective would encompass the OPCW 
addressing non-proliferation in a greater capacity by raising 
awareness	 amongst	 the	 scientifi	c	 community,	 promoting	
best practices in safety and security, and educating small 
and medium sized chemical companies about the CWC. 
Those activities are vital for fostering a greater culture 
of responsibility – beyond safety and environmental 
protection – by expanding ethical behaviour and practices 
to include the security of society.   One measurement of 
the current environment of rooted non-proliferation ideals 
is the amount of publicly available codes of practice 
(codes) at chemical associations and companies.  Codes 
are	moral	compasses	that	refl	ect	the	principled	foundation	
upon which laws stand.3 
Having guns, guards, and gates are important traditional 
security measures, but are ineffective if guards fall asleep 
at their post, are unprepared to use weapons to subdue 
an	 infi	ltrator,	 or	 do	 not	 ensure	 appropriate	 entryways	 are	
kept locked.  This is where codes act as a tool, by setting 
expected or required behaviour of a company’s employees 
or an association’s members based on a set of ethical 
values. 
The applicability and 
enforceability to bring 
about behavioural change 
is based on the type of 
code: aspirational codes 
set out ideals to champion; 
educational/advisory codes 
establish guidelines on 
appropriate behaviour; and 
enforceable codes codify 
practices by connecting 
behaviour to professional 
and legal regulations.4  
Thus, codes can be utilized 
to establish a security 
culture that gives a moral 
impetus for all employees, 
not just security guards, to, 
for example, lock storage 
areas containing chemicals or equipment that could be 
exploited by others to kill, injure, or terrorize. 
Providing a greater sense of social responsibility is why 
many companies and associations have codes, whether 
it is a company edging out a competitor because of its 
practices or an association member demonstrating greater 
professionalism. However, the public acknowledgement 
of chemical weapons non-proliferation and security as a 
written value in chemical industry and association codes 
remains mostly lacking, which indicates why there is a 
need for greater awareness and education programmes 
to promote buy-in.5
Codifi	cation	of	non-proliferation	ideals	tracks	and	maps	the	
spread of non-proliferation in associations and industry, 
and acts as a tool to safeguard against the negative 
consequences of future Fritz Habers – winner of the Nobel 
How Codes of Practice Enhance a 
Chemical Security Culture
By: Aaron C. Gluck 1
A security checkpoint at a National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
facility, which helps “ensure that the mission of NIH is not im-
peded by personal attacks, loss of assets, criminal activity or 
acts of terrorism.”  Security Guards, Offi ce of Research Services 
(Bethesda: National Institutes of Health), www.ors.od.nih.gov.
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Prize in Chemistry and the “father of chemical warfare” – 
and leaving only the good for humanity.6    
Chemical Companies7
The chemical industry is one of the primary areas of focus 
Mr. Üzümcü mentioned for awareness and education 
because they are the group that is the most likely to handle 
and trade large amounts of toxic chemicals or have access 
to dual-use equipment.  Chemical companies treat codes 
as a catalyst for investment, new business opportunities, 
and	 consumer	 confi	dence	 with	 a	 company’s	 practices,	
which is evident by companies placing codes either in their 
“investor relations” or “social responsibility” section of their 
website.8   
Large chemical companies were the most likely to 
include security and non-proliferation in their code as 
compared to small 
chemical companies. 
As seen in Chart 
1, large chemical 
companies and small 
chemical companies 
treat security as a 
business principle on 
opposite spectrums; 
67 large and 13 small 
chemical companies 
include security in 
their code.9 This is 
an area where large 
chemical companies 
can act as advocates 
in education and 
awareness-ra is ing 
programmes for small 
companies. 
For large chemical 
companies who handle over a billion dollars’ worth of sales 
globally every year, it is understandable that two-thirds of 
the companies consider security an important factor for 
maintaining constant operations by reducing any risk as 
much as possible. 
Security	provides	tangible	benefi	ts	for	profi	tability	–	such	
as protecting against theft, diversion, and sabotage – 
whether or not they are conscious of the simultaneous 
benefi	ts	 for	 non-proliferation.10 These positive effects of 
security measures can be the starting point for education 
and awareness-raising programmes for small chemical 
companies, which in large part do not include security as 
a business principle. 
However, the ideal situation is that companies include 
security in their code because they know of the added 
benefi	t	 for	 non-proliferation.	 While	 large	 chemical	
companies	are	more	likely	(see	Chart	1)	to	be	fl	ag	bearers	
for chemical weapons non-proliferation as a business 
principle, overall the low amount of companies which 
include it in their codes is troubling considering they are 
most likely aware of such efforts because of strict export 
and import control, chemical security, and anti-terrorism 
laws in industrialized countries. 
Even though small chemical companies are less likely 
to handle the same quantities of toxic chemicals as their 
larger counterparts, they are just as susceptible to theft or 
diversion of chemicals, equipment, or information.  Small 
chemical companies that face the same threat without the 
capital to purchase expensive security systems should 
address that limitation by including security and non-
proliferation consciousness as a principle so employees 
know how to react to a security incident. 
Adherence to 
relevant laws is 
signifi	cant,	 but	
including non-
proliferation within 
their code would 
strengthen the 
adoption of the 
international norm 
against chemical 
weapons as a 
practice also at 
the organizational 
level. 
Codes	also	infl	uence	
employees to not 
just follow the law 
because it is the law, 
but because it is the 
right thing to do with 
little to almost no 
investment needed. Companies who include security and 
non-proliferation in their code could serve as “champions” 
for awareness-raising and education programmes, as they 
demonstrate	 the	 feasibility	 of	 such	 ideals	with	 profi	table	
business operations.
Chemical Associations11
Codes in chemical associations provide a second 
window through which to explore the prevalence of 
security and non-proliferation in the larger chemical 
community because of the diverse nature of their 
membership.  The language within an association’s 
code reflects a collective agreement of what members 
from industry, academia, and the government consider 
to be universal moral practices.
Codes demonstrate an understanding that adverse 
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behaviours by an individual 
can negatively impact 
upon the community, 
thus serving as a way 
to harmonize socially 
responsible behaviour to 
distinguish members from 
others. Only about a sixth 
of the surveyed national 
and international chemical 
associations include 
security in their code. 
Even fewer associations 
include non-proliferation, 
two national and two 
international chemical 
associations.12
The low amount of 
associations that include 
non-proliferation and 
security within codes can 
refl	ect	 either	 a	 lack	 of	
agreement that it is the 
responsibility of the profession, a lack of appreciation of 
their importance, or a mixture of both.  Considering the 
low amount of such language in codes, engaging with 
chemical associations for programmes would accomplish 
two goals Mr. Üzümcü mentioned.  
International chemical associations can use a code to help 
members implement security and non-proliferation best 
practices, which facilitates the secure international trade 
of goods, services, or knowledge between likeminded 
members. In turn, national associations can incorporate 
international best practices and ideals into national action 
plans that utilize the local environment and culture.  
CWC education and awareness-raising programmes 
aimed at chemical associations that accomplish 
buy-in would foster the adoption of non-proliferation 
ideals amongst membership and provide a forum for 
determining best practices for different sectors of 
chemistry. Such programmes can tap into the fact that 
many chemical associations include the advancement 
of chemistry in their mission statement, and public 
acknowledgement that security and non-proliferation 
are ethical practices per 
their code would show 
that advancement does 
not come at the cost of 
peaceful applications of 
the science.
 
Conclusion
A vast majority of large 
chemical companies include 
security language in their 
code, but they and other 
chemical entities have yet 
to endorse publicly on a 
signifi	cant	 scale	 chemical	
weapons non-proliferation 
as an ethical practice within 
their codes. Mr. Üzümcü’s 
remarks speak to a real 
need to prevent non-state 
actors with malevolent intent 
from acquiring chemicals, 
technology, or information.
While including security and non-proliferation in codes 
is not the only measurement of commitment, it links 
morals to practices. Current non-proliferation funding is 
being outpaced by the growth of the chemistry sector, 
which adds emphasis for prioritizing the promotion of 
the CWC’s ideals through education and awareness 
raising programmes.   Increasing the amount of public 
commitments to non-proliferation and security as ethical 
practices	 infl	uences	 the	 formation	 of	 industry	 and	
professional standards in a self-sustaining momentum 
that brings new people into the fold and pinpoints the 
outliers. 
Current and future champions can help translate those 
ideals from treaties and laws to moral behaviour within 
associations	or	amongst	those	who	get	their	fi	rst	exposure	
to non-proliferation in education and awareness raising 
programmes.13 Chemical company and association 
codes illustrate the need and the distribution of the CWC’s 
ideals, the same ideals that are necessary to prevent 
rogue scientists, technicians, employees, and individuals 
from tainting chemistry with malevolence.
A photo of a group of students from developing countries 
who receive training from the OPCW in an effort to facilitate 
national implementation of the CWC.  This is an excellent 
example of how to train new generations of scientists about 
the importance of the CWC’s ideals, while also demonstrating 
the leadership role companies can take in spreading CWC 
awareness by hosting these students.  OPCW photo.
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Multiple Uses of Chemicals: Choices for 
Chemists and the Public
By Alastair Hay and Peter Mahaffy
The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize every year celebrates outstanding achievements that contribute to making peace in our troubled world. 
There has been speculation about why Alfred Nobel, 
who invented dynamite and the smokeless propellant 
Ballistite, chose peace as a Nobel Prize category. 
Perhaps his motivation came from Bertha von Suttner, a 
close friend who was a peace activist, or perhaps Nobel 
simply wished to honour choices made by scientists and 
ordinary individuals to work for peace.
The OPCW received the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize for its 
tireless work to rid the world of chemical weapons.  Millions 
of hours of political negotiations have led to the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC), 
which with the addition of 
Syria, is now signed by 190 
countries. The most visible 
features of the OPCW 
are its work at the political 
level,	 as	 well	 as	 scientifi	c	
and technical work to verify 
the implementation of the 
Convention, and to anticipate 
and proactively address new 
areas of potential concern, 
such as the convergence of 
biology and chemistry. 
Following joint discussions 
in 2005 with the International Union of Pure and Applied 
Chemistry (IUPAC), the OPCW and IUPAC agreed that if the 
world is to truly be free of threats from chemical weapons, 
it would be crucial to also engage students, teachers, and 
the general public, so that the next generation of scientists, 
citizens, and decision makers thinks about choices and 
understands their responsibilities. 
This workshop led to several joint IUPAC/OPCW projects 
that created an initial set of interactive electronic educational 
materials. These were used with chemists and educators 
around the world to communicate the responsibility each 
of us has to make the right choices to use chemicals 
responsibly	and	for	benefi	cial	purposes.	
In August 2013, following a recommendation from the 
OPCW Temporary Working Group on Education and 
Outreach in Science and Technology Relevant to the CWC, 
a joint IUPAC/OPCW project was launched with two goals: 
to create a new interactive website, and to model engaging 
ways of presenting material on choices and responsible 
use of chemicals. The site, available at www.multiple.kcvs.
ca, takes the approach of helping different audiences think 
about responsible choices they can choose to make with 
respect to the use of chemicals.  
Using case studies, questions, and role play, the interactive 
materials	start	with	the	benefi	cial	uses	of	chemicals,	and	
then lead users through examples of the misuse and 
abuse of chemicals. 
The site ends by introducing the CWC, which represents 
an example of choices made by nations to work for 
peace. Students, educators, 
policymakers, and the general 
public are invited, through 
different portals, to explore 
what is being done to monitor 
the abuse of multi-use 
chemicals, and to discover the 
responsibilities of both scientists 
and the public in responding to 
the misuse of chemicals, such 
as in the production of chemical 
weapons. 
The interactive web materials, 
developed through this joint 
project of the OPCW and 
IUPAC, were created by the students and faculty at the 
King’s Centre for Visualization in Edmonton, Canada, 
working closely with members of the OPCW’s Education 
and Outreach temporary working group, OPCW staff, and 
its	Scientifi	c	Advisory	Board.	
In addition to providing interactive resources, a second goal 
of the joint project is to model ways in which information 
about the multiple uses of chemicals and the CWC, can be 
presented in engaging and interactive ways.  Project Task 
Force co-leaders Alastair Hay and Peter Mahaffy piloted the 
new interactive materials with chemists and educators at 
the IUPAC World Chemistry Congress in Istanbul in August 
2013. The interactive session, which included role playing 
about making choices regarding the use of chemicals, was 
fi	lmed	professionally	by	the	OPCW.
Excerpts of the footage will soon be available on the 
website to help educators and other communicators see 
Case Studies
A screenshot from the Multiple Uses of Chemistry website
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how audiences can be engaged with the new materials. 
One of the examples included on the new multiple uses 
education website and discussed at the IUPAC Congress 
workshop in Istanbul is the nerve agent Sarin. The need for 
widespread understanding among all citizens of the world 
about the multiple uses of chemicals and the CWC was 
demonstrated	emphatically	 by	 the	horrifi	c	 use	of	Sarin	 in	
Damascus,	just	fi	ve	days	after	the	IUPAC	Istanbul	workshop.	
For further information about the website, or suggestions 
for other materials and approaches that could be included, 
please contact:
•	 peter.mahaffy@kingsu.ca
•	 A.W.M.Hay@leeds.ac.uk 
Peter Mahaffy and Alastair Hay are members of the OPCW 
Temporary Working Group on Education and Outreach, 
and have worked together on developing and implementing 
educational materials related to multiple uses of chemicals 
since the 2005 Joint IUPAC/OPCW Oxford workshop. 
Peter Mahaffy is Professor of Chemistry at the King’s 
University College Edmonton, Canada, Co-director of the 
King’s Centre for Visualization in Science, and Past-Chair 
of IUPAC’s Committee on Chemistry Education.  
Alastair Hay is Professor of Environmental Toxicology 
at the University of Leeds, England. He has worked on 
chemical weapons issues for more than 35 years and 
conducted six investigations of real and alleged chemical 
weapon use.
Only	 recently	 has	 the	 OPCW	 acquired	 world-wide fame. Before being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2013 its name, its 
mandate,	 and	 the	 location	of	 its	headquarters	were	
unknown to most people. Even chemistry teachers 
and students in the vicinity of The Hague knew very 
little about the OPCW. Now, with the 
production of a high school module on 
the OPCW, there are new ways to keep 
awareness high, even when the public’s 
memory of the Nobel Peace Prize has 
faded.
One of the activities proposed by the 
OPCW Temporary Working Group on 
education and outreach was the production 
of educational materials for high school 
students and teachers. For practical 
reasons, practitioners such as teachers, 
lecturers and chemists, should be the ones 
to develop these materials. Furthermore, it 
was proposed that a pilot project would be 
undertaken with a group of Dutch educators.
The project was a collaborative venture between the 
municipality of The Hague, Leiden University, and the 
OPCW. Chemistry teachers from the Johan de Witt 
college, the Vrijzinnig-Christelijk Lyceum (VCL) and the 
International School of The Hague proved to be interested 
and were therefore engaged to help write an educational 
module for upper level high school students. In order to 
reach a wide audience the module was written in English, 
and	the	International	Baccalaureate	Global	Offi	ce	in	The	
Hague was also approached to participate. 
Funded	 by	 the	UK	Foreign	 and	Commonwealth	Offi	ce,	
the City Council of The Hague and Leiden University, 
a	 team	of	fi	ve	writers	was	 formed,	headed	by	Dr.	Ludo	
Juurlink, director of Leiden University’s Junior Science 
Lab. They decided to write a student workbook based on 
three topics: chemical weapons, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC), and ethics in science. 
The	fi	rst	topic	was	chosen	because	teachers	
would probably require a direct link to their 
chemistry curricula if they were to even 
consider incorporating an extracurricular 
project into their already busy schedules. 
The	 fi	rst	 chapter	 therefore	 not	 only	
focuses	 on	 topics	 such	 as	 a	 defi	nition	 of	
chemical weapons, dual use chemicals, 
and widely known chemical weapons, but 
also discusses topics such as synthesis 
and GC-MS detection, and physiological 
effects explained in terms of proteins and 
DNA. Chapter One provides content for 
three chemical topics that can be treated 
separately.
Chapter Two introduces the CWC and OPCW, mostly 
through	 self	 and	 group	 study.	 	 The	 fi	lm	 “A	 Teacher’s	
Mission”, produced recently by the OPCW Media 
and Public Affairs Branch (see the article by Chretien 
Schouteten in this issue of OPCW Today), is used to 
trigger students’ interest in the historical background 
of chemical weapons. This is followed by an individual 
assignment to write an article on the CWC for a popular 
science journal. 
Chemistry in confl ict: Spreading the 
word to high school students 
By Ludo Juurlink
Front Cover of the fi rst draft 
of the Chemistry in Conﬂ ict 
workbook.
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Projects in Education and Outreach 
Relevant to the CWC: A Pilot Activity in 
Argentina
By Alejandra Suarez and Rolando Spanevello
The third activity is a class debate on Xanadu, a country 
considering ratifying the Convention following the recent 
use	of	chemical	weapons	in	a	local	armed	conflict.	Students	
present the positions of various stakeholders, e.g. members 
of Xanadu’s armed forces, chemistry students, owners of a 
chemical company, concerned civilians, OPCW delegates, 
and victims of chemical weapons.
Chapter Three introduces ethical 
considerations in science and 
technology in general, and with 
regard to chemical weapons in 
particular.	 The	 first	 topic	 uses	 a	
historical perspective and invites 
students to consider uses of chemical 
weapons since the First World War. 
This is followed by an introduction 
to three normative ethical systems, 
and their application to the use of 
chemical weapons.  
Finally, students apply their 
knowledge to a case study. As the 
workbook will initially be tested 
in the Netherlands, the current case study focuses on 
the supply of monoethylene glycol (MEG) to Syria by a 
Dutch company. Students use internet sources and media 
articles to prepare for a classroom debate. This particular 
topic could easily be changed to something more relevant 
to another country.
To enable teachers to incorporate experiments into the 
project, Chapter Four offers suggestions for laboratory 
experiments. As available laboratory equipment and 
funds vary across high schools, simple experiments and 
chemicals were used. The chapter therefore starts with 
background information on the physical and chemical 
background of activated carbon, a cheap material used to 
filter	chemicals	from	gaseous	and	liquid	streams.	
\Three separate experiments are described; in these 
students test the actual activated carbon used in gas masks 
for quality, again relying on prior chemical knowledge and 
skills, such as acid-base and redox titrations. Finally, two 
additional suggestions are provided for students interested 
in	 basing	 their	 final	 year	 research	
project on this material. Breakthrough 
– the point where chemicals make it 
through	the	filter	–	was	chosen	as	the	
problem to study.
As the amount of time that teachers 
can spend on this project will vary, 
the workbook and materials have 
been designed in a modular fashion. 
Teachers are recommended to spend 
at least three lessons covering the 
first	 topic	 of	 each	 of	 the	 first	 three	
chapters. However, the module will 
take approximately 12 lessons if the 
entire workbook is used.
Two out of the three schools which 
participated in the production of the workbook, will test it 
in the next few months. To this end, a teacher’s manual 
and lesson guides are currently being written. Two other 
schools that were not involved in the writing will also test 
these materials.
Feedback from these schools will be incorporated into the 
final	 version	 of	 the	 first	 edition,	 which	 is	 expected	 to	 be	
freely available to schools around the world in May 2014. 
From then on it should be much easier to spread the word 
about the OPCW, to keep a new generation informed on 
the need for continued compliance with the CWC, and 
to implement ethical considerations in chemistry in high 
schools around the globe. 
Education and outreach are long term strategic tools for the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the peaceful use 
of chemistry. They are also considered key elements in 
preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons.
Considering the limited exposure that chemists have to ethical 
norms and the aims of the CWC during their careers, this 
approach is particularly important for the chemical community. 
On the other hand, the new developments in science 
and technology that are paving the way for a multitude of 
opportunities	 beneficial	 to	 humankind	 could	 also	 open	 the	
door to unforeseen challenges and abuses. For this reason, 
awareness-raising about the multiple uses of chemical 
substances	and	the	dual	use	nature	of	scientific	knowledge	is	
an	urgent	need	in	the	field	of	chemical	education.	
Chemistry students at the Vrijzinnig Chris-
telijk Lyceum in The Hague, conducting one 
of the experiments included in the work-
book.
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In order to  contribute towards this endeavour a pilot works 
entitled “Chemistry for peace: ethics and professional 
responsibility in education” was held in Rosario, Argentina, 
on 27 and 28 June 2013. The participants in the workshop 
were academics, scientists, and representatives of 
professional	 and	 scientific	 associations,	 from	 all	 over	
the country. The objectives of 
the workshop were to provide an 
opportunity to exchange experiences, 
and to develop proposals for chemical 
education related to emphasising the 
potential risks posed by the multiple 
uses of chemicals, and the dual use 
nature	of	scientific	knowledge.	In	this	
way, the workshop could contribute 
to the prevention of the misuse of 
toxic chemicals; facilitate chemical 
safety and chemical security; build 
skills and capabilities in areas related 
to the peaceful uses of chemistry; 
raise awareness of the CWC among 
the broad community of relevant 
professionals who should be aware of 
it; and build networks in chemical education.
The speakers were Professor Alastair Hay, Mr Stefan 
Mogl and Professor Djafer Benachour from the OPCW’s 
Temporary Working Group on Education and Outreach; 
Mr Daniel Feakes from the OPCW Technical Secretariat; 
Professor Rolando A. Spanevello, former member of 
the	 OPCW	 Scientific	Advisory	 Board	 and	Minister	 Jaime	
Beserman from the National Authority of Argentina.
The workshop included two round tables: one on institutional 
policies, and one on sstrategies in chemical education. The 
first	 was	 devoted	 to	 discussing	 programmes	 carried	 out	
in education, science, and technology, while the second 
addressed new challenges in approaching the issues of 
ethics and professional responsibility, and the CWC. The 
round table panels were made up of representatives of 
the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Science and 
Technology, the National Research Council, Professional 
and	Scientific	Associations,	and	the	Forum	of	Deans	from	
Schools related to chemistry.
The	participants	engaged	in	very	profitable	discussions	on	
general topics such as:
•	 How can undergraduate and graduate education 
programmes address the ethical and practical aspects 
of preventing the misuse of chemistry?
•	 How	 can	 we	 encourage	 universities	 to	 reflect	 the	
issues of the CWC in their curricula?
•	 What information should be provided?
•	 What are the strategies for implementation?
•	 What teaching material can be made available to 
professors?
As a practical example, an interactive exercise, involving 
a broad spectrum of students, took place during the last 
session of the workshop, under the guidance of Professor 
Alastair Hay. In this exercise the students were confronted 
with different ethical dilemmas. As the result of this 
experience, the students became highly motivated and 
proposed that activities to prevent 
the misuse of chemistry should be 
considered throughout the course of 
their careers.
Workshop participants also watched 
the	 OPCW	 film	 “Fires:	 A	 Teacher’s	
Mission” (see the article by Chrétien 
Schouteten in this issue of OPCW 
Today), which was considered a 
very useful means of promoting the 
mission of the OPCW to both students 
and the general public.
In summarising the outcome of the 
workshop, we can mention that the 
participants enjoyed the meeting, 
finding	it	to	be	very	dynamic	as	a	wide	range	of	opinions	was	
expressed.  It was clear that the topics had generated plenty 
of discussion, and what is also important is that, in many 
cases, the participants were exposed to a new approach to 
chemical education. 
The main conclusion from the workshop was that there was a 
complete general consensus on the urgent need to address 
the subject of professional ethics and responsibility at 
different levels during the careers of the future professionals. 
and it was proposed that each institution develop actions in 
order to include both them and the issues relevant to the 
CWC in the chemical curricula. 
The	participants	identified	the	following	goals:
•	 the implementation of “train-the-trainer” courses;
•	 the development of educational tools and materials for 
chemistry teachers; and
•	 the promotion of active collaboration through the 
recently organised network of education in chemistry. 
It is important to emphasise the key role that the National 
Authority of each country can play in education and outreach. 
The	workshop	 in	Rosario	 reflected	 the	 joint	 efforts	made	
by the National Authority and the academic community in 
Argentina to develop activities towards the implementation 
of the CWC, and to prevent the re-emergence of chemical 
weapons. 
We are very grateful to the OPCW for facilitating the 
participation of international experts and to the European 
Union	for	providing	the	necessary	financial	support.
From left-to-right: Alistar Hay, Stefan Mogl, 
Alejandra Suarez, Djafer Benachour for the 
TWG on Education and Outreach and Daniel 
Feakes from the Technical Secretariat.
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Celebration of the 40th Anniversary 
of the Finnish Research Project on the 
Verification of Chemical Disarmament
By Vesa Häkkinen 
The	Finnish	Institute	for	Verification	of	the	Chemical	Weapons Convention (VERIFIN) celebrated its 40th anniversary on 4 October 2013. VERIFIN’s forerunner, 
the	 Finnish	 Research	 Project	 on	 the	 Verification	 of	
Chemical Disarmament (CW project), was established in 
1973. VERIFIN itself was 
established in 1994 as 
an independent institute 
at the University of 
Helsinki. 
The initiative for the 
CW project came from 
Jorma K. Miettinen, a 
highly regarded expert in 
disarmament. The goal of 
the project was to produce 
and	 publish	 scientific	
data on chemical warfare 
agent-related chemicals 
to support the Geneva 
negotiations aiming for 
a universal Chemical 
Weapons Convention 
(CWC). Finland’s mission 
in these negotiations was, 
with the help of the CW 
project,	 to	 create	 efficient	
verification	measures	for	the	convention.
The	 celebration	 started	 with	 a	 scientific	 seminar	 at	 the	
Chemicum, University of Helsinki. VERIFIN has been part 
of the Department of Chemistry since the beginning of 2010. 
VERIFIN’s director, Professor Paula Vanninen, opened the 
seminar by welcoming the audience. This was followed by 
expressions of congratulations by Professor Markku Räsänen, 
the director of the Department of Chemistry, and Professor 
Marja-Liisa Riekkola, the Vice-Dean of the Faculty of Science. 
The	 first	 speaker	was	 international	 disarmament	 consultant	
Dr Ralf Trapp, a respected expert on chemical weapons 
disarmament who had a long career at the OPCW. Dr Trapp 
gave an interesting overview of how the threat of chemical 
warfare has changed over the last 40 years.
The presentation 
highlighted the process 
of negotiations which 
resulted in the CWC 
and its achievements. 
Dr Trapp ended his 
presentation by describing 
the dramatic use of 
chemical weapons in Syria 
and the repercussions, 
including the international 
agreement to destroy 
these weapons by the 
end of June 2014. Dr 
Trapp	 firmly	 believes	
that the weapons can be 
destroyed as planned 
and that the OPCW will 
be able to accomplish this 
difficult	mission.
Dr Maciej Sliwakowski 
explained the differences between chemical warfare 
investigations as undertaken by the OPCW and by the United 
Nations	Monitoring,	Verification	 and	 Inspection	Commission	
(UNMOVIC). 
Dr Sliwakowski described the UNMOVIC mission in Iraq, 
where	the	tasks	varied	from	sample	collection	to	field	analysis	
and chemical weapons destruction, which made planning the 
necessary	actions	difficult.	Much	improvisation	was	required	to	
solve unexpected problems. 
H.E. Director General Ahmet Üzümcü at the 40th anniversary 
celebration of VERIFIN at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,  together 
with (from the left) Chanchellor Thomas Willhelmsson, Under-
Secretary of State Jaakko Laajava, Minister for Foreign Affairs  Erkki 
Tuomioja and Director Paula Vanninen. Photo: Eero Kuosmanen, 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
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Alejandra G. Suárez is Professor of Organic Chemistry 
at the Universidad Nacional de Rosario and researcher 
of the Consejo  Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas 
y Técnicas, Argentina. Since 2009 she has been a 
member of the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board, and 
its Chairperson since June 2013. Her main research 
interest focuses on the sustainable production 
of materials from biomass for their application in 
asymmetric organic synthesis.
Rolando A. Spanevello is Professor of Organic Chemistry 
at Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Argentina. He has 
been visiting scholar at the University of Michigan and 
Universidad Complutense. From 2003 to 2009 he served 
as a member of the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board. 
In 2013 he was elected President of the Argentine 
Research Society on Organic Chemistry. His research 
encompasses the interest in green chemistry, natural 
products synthesis and development of new materials.
OPCW Today
On Disarmament and Non-Proliferation 
Education
The varied background and short training of the UNMOVIC 
inspectors also caused problems in unforeseen situations. 
The OPCW inspectors are well trained and used to 
working	 in	 teams.	OPCW	inspections	 follow	well	defined	
procedures	which	help	to	fulfill	the	inspection	tasks.
Dr Robert Read from dstl, UK, gave an overview 
of biomedical sample analysis in cases of alleged 
use of chemical weapons. Dr Hugh Gregg from the 
OPCW Laboratory briefed the audience on OPCW’s 
preparedness to collect environmental and biomedical 
samples in Syria.
Dr Gregg said that although the OPCW is well prepared 
for environmental sampling, prior to 2013 preparedness 
for collecting biomedical samples was poor. Because 
of the events in Syria improvements have been made 
and currently the OPCW is also well prepared to collect 
biomedical samples, as was demonstrated in Syria.
Dr	Robin	Black,	a	former	member	of	the	OPCW	Scientific	
Advisory Board , gave an overview of the impact of the 
latest	scientific	developments	in	chemistry	and	technology	
on the CWC. Ms Kansikas-Debraise illustrated the export 
control mechanisms of dual use goods carried out by 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Mr Söderström gave 
an overview of challenges in the analysis of chemical 
warfare agents – what has been done in the past and 
what is planned for the future. 
The	scientific	session	ended	with	a	 round-table	session,	
and it was not surprising that most of the discussion was 
on the events in Syria.
The afternoon session, held at the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs of Finland, focused on general issues relating to 
disarmament. Opening remarks were made by Secretary 
of State Pertti Torstila from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
H.E. Ahmet Üzümcü Director General of the OPCW, gave 
the	keynote	speech	on	verification	 in	disarmament.	H.E.	
Üzümcü emphasized the important role of Finland and 
VERIFIN	 in	 establishing	 reliable	 verification	 methods	 to	
support the CWC, and congratulated the institute on its 
40th anniversary.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Erkki Tuomioja, 
highlighted Finnish disarmament policy and its goals. In 
his speech Minister Tuomioja mentioned the valuable 
work of VERIFIN in analysing the samples from Syria, 
and offered the assistance and support of Finland in the 
destruction of chemical weapons in Syria. 
Emeritus Professor Erkki Rahkamaa shared his memories 
of the early days of the CW project. It was amazing to 
see how many scientists had voluntarily contributed 
to making the project a real success. The Director of 
VERIFIN, Professor Paula Vanninen presented VERFIN’s 
current activities. The afternoon session was closed by 
the Chancellor of the University of Helsinki, Thomas 
Wilhelmsson, who congratulated VERIFIN on its valuable 
40 years of work for Finland and for the University. 
The celebration of the 40th anniversary of VERIFIN 
ended with a reception hosted by the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs of Finland. 
Vesa Häkkinen graduated from the University of Helsinki 
in 1986 (Analytical Chemistry) and joined VERIFIN in 
1989 as a research scientist. HIs current duties consist 
of providing training on several annual training courses in 
Finland and abroad (research scientist and instructor of 
training laboratory 2004 – 2008 and from 2008 Laboratory 
manager of training laboratory) and duties of National 
Authority in national implementation of the CWC.
By Onur Güven 
Since 2010, the OPCW and the T.M.C. Asser Instituut (Asser Institute) have organised an annual Summer Programme on ‘Disarmament 
and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction’ (led by Michael Luhan from the OPCW 
and Tanya Mehra from the Asser Institute), taking 
place in early September. What began as a summer 
programme attracting mainly students, has gradually 
grown into an advanced programme attracting 
students and young professionals alike, from a 
wide range of countries. This diversity enhances the 
Summer	Programme	as	it	reflects	the	complex	nature	
of the topic and its global orientation. 
Throughout the years, the programme has incorporated 
an expanding set of tools, in addition to lectures, to 
enrich the participants’ experience and to increase the 
dissemination	 of	 knowledge.	 These	 tools	 include	 field	
visits (a tour at and around the TNO laboratory, with a 
live exercise by the OPCW involving an investigation 
of alleged use of chemical weapons; a demonstration 
of OPCW industrial inspection equipment in Rijswijk; 
a tour of a chemical plant site in Rotterdam that is the 
subject of inspections; and a visit to the TU Delft nuclear 
research reactor); access to an online information platform 
(providing the presentations and articles by the speakers, 
a reader containing introductory material and a collection 
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of the various treaties, agreements, and instruments); 
an introductory multiple choice quiz to provide food for 
thought on the various topics; and discussion panels to 
provide opportunity for discourse on various matters.
Besides the opening and 
closing receptions, the 
programme also includes two 
other social events: a dinner, 
which offers an opportunity 
for the participants to get 
acquainted with each 
other and the programme 
organisers; and a brown bag 
lunch, where participants 
have the chance to hear from 
one of the speakers about 
how to pursue a career in the 
world of WMD disarmament 
and non-proliferation, and 
to	 reflect	 on	 the	 speaker’s	
personal experiences.
The Summer Programme 
usually kicks off on a Sunday 
with a welcoming reception, 
after which the intensive programme starts on Monday 
morning and lasts until Friday afternoon, when the 
programme concludes with a closing reception and the 
awarding	of	the	certificates.	
This year’s Fourth Summer Programme was attended by 
twenty-six participants from various parts of Europe, Asia, 
Africa, and North America. The majority of these participants 
were young professionals working for various stakeholder 
organisations such as governments, international organisations, 
research centres, industry, and NGOs. Moreover, during the 
Third and Fourth Summer Programmes, participants in the 
UN Programme of Fellowship on Disarmament joined the 
programme for one day during their visit to The Hague. 
The programme’s curriculum consists mainly of lectures 
on matters covering policy, law, science and technology, 
and the organisation of WMD disarmament and non-
proliferation.	 This	 approach	 not	 only	 reflects	 the	
interdisciplinary	 nature	 of	 the	 field,	 but	 also	 provides	
an opportunity for professionals to get acquainted with 
dilemmas and instruments outside the scope of their 
professional expertise/academic discipline. 
The lectures are given by diplomats, consultants, and 
researchers from various organisations (OPCW, BWC ISU, 
IAEA and CTBTO Preparatory Commission, universities 
and NGOs). 
This year’s programme started on Monday with introductory 
topics, including the historic uses and impact of WMDs, 
the law of collective security, the role of the EU in WMD 
disarmament and non-proliferation, and a condensed 
introduction to the dual-use nature of chemistry, biology, 
and nuclear physics. 
On Tuesday, the programme 
dived	 into	 the	 field	 of	
nuclear weapons and 
disarmament, addressing 
the legal frameworks of 
the NPT and CTBT, the 
organisational frameworks 
of the IAEA and the CTBTO 
Preparatory Commission, 
compliance	 and	 verification	
instruments related to 
nuclear programmes and 
explosive testing, the 
importance of the Fissile 
Material (Cut-off) Treaty, the 
various multilateral export 
control regimes, and issues 
concerning nuclear security. 
On Wednesday, the 
programme focussed on the disarmament and non-
proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, addressing 
the history and achievements of the OPCW and the BWC 
ISU;	CWC	and	BWC	compliance	and	verification	instruments;	
national implementation under the CWC; and the challenges 
facing the OPCW and the BWC ISU. 
On	Thursday,	the	programme	included	the	various	field	visits	
mentioned above, and concluded with a presentation on the 
prospects for the Nuclear Security Summit to be held in The 
Hague in 2014. 
On Friday, the programme concluded with lectures on 
the UN investigative mechanism, and the impact of WMD 
programmes. These were followed by discussion panels on, 
among other subjects, nuclear safety and security, chemical 
safety and security, and engaging academia and civil society 
in WMD disarmament and non-proliferation. Throughout these 
four years the programme has grown to become a prominent 
event	in	the	field	of	education	and	outreach	on	disarmament	
and non-proliferation.
Mr Onur Güven <o.guven@asser.nl> is a researcher on arms 
control, disarmament and non-proliferation law at the Asser 
Institute. This writing reflects his personal experience as a 
participant in the First Summer Programme, and through his 
assistance in the Third and Fourth Summer Programmes.
OPCW Director-General  Ahmet Üzümcü addresses  
participants in the summer programme 
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Chemistry and Ethics in Secondary 
Education: 25 years of experience with 
classroom teaching on chemical weapons
By Chretien Schouteten
Why the choice of this project? As a teacher I wanted to make a contribution to the moral education of my students. So, as a teacher 
of chemistry, I seized the opportunity to devote a 
couple of lessons to the social responsibility of 
chemists and the ethical dilemmas with which they 
are confronted.  By 
choosing the theme 
of ‘chemical weapons’ 
I wanted to stimulate 
thinking about social 
responsibility among 
my students, and thus to 
encourage them in their 
personal development.  
I decided to organise 
the project for students 
over sixteen, so for late 
adolescents and young adults. Younger students are 
often too focussed on themselves and on their peer 
groups.
I started cautiously (in 1980), with only one lesson about 
the basic chemistry of a few types of chemical weapons 
and a few historical facts. Inspired by the unexpected 
enthusiasm of the students, I gradually extended the 
number of my lessons, eventually to about 12 lessons. 
With the help of colleagues from different disciplines 
(chemistry, biology, history, law, ethics, literature, arts, 
and music) I approached the theme from various angles. 
In	 the	fi	nal	 lessons	 I	 invited	my	pupils	 to	express	 their	
thoughts and feelings in a creative way, for example by 
means of a poem, a picture, or a photo.  
 
My experiences 
In order to involve pupils actively, the lessons had to be 
interactive and varied from the beginning. For this reason, 
I started by inviting the students (in groups of 3 or 4) to 
brainstorm about the subject in order to raise their own 
(initial) questions. These questions did not necessarily 
have to address chemical aspects of the theme. 
This theme cannot be viewed from a single angle. 
Students need to examine the ethical dilemmas of 
chemists, historical backgrounds, international politics, 
and so on. My students could study educational 
handouts I had compiled, sometimes with the help of 
colleagues from other disciplines, such as literature, 
arts, and music. Their help played an important part 
in expressing ‘the (in)human factor’ in this theme. I 
conclude that the multi-disciplinary approach helped to:
•	 Raise many questions 
about chemistry and ethics;
•	 stimulate critical 
thinking;
•	 show students the need 
for careful discussion and 
cooperation; 
•	 broaden and deepen 
their general knowledge 
and abilities;
•	 demonstrate the 
complexity of the ethical dilemmas with which 
chemists are confronted; and
•	 enable students to express their feelings and 
thoughts in a creative manner.
Whether the moral values of the students were actually 
raised by this project remains of course a matter of 
conjecture. But I hope and trust that the lessons helped 
to do so. 
Chrétien Schouteten worked as a chemistry teacher in 
the Netherlands from 1976 to 2009. He developed a 
range of educational material on the subject of chemistry 
and ethics, and shared his experiences in publications 
and workshops. In 2010, he wrote a moving play entitled 
“The Chemist”, about the tragic life of Fritz Haber and 
his family. In 2012, Eric Vander Borght (OPCW Media & 
Public Affairs Branch) produced the fi lm “Fires, Episode 
1: A Teacher’s Mission” about Schouteten’s work. 
Schouteten has also written a lesson plan and student 
handout to accompany the fi lm when used in the 
classroom. The fi lm is available at www.thefi resproject.
com and the lesson plan will also be available soon 
at the same address. With fi nancial support from the 
United Kingdom, the fi lm (originally in English) has been 
subtitled into the other offi cial OPCW languages (Arabic, 
Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish).
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Suggestions for Lessons 
Chemistry
 
Topics:
•	 Definition	and	types	of	chemical	weapons.	The	differences	with	biological	weapons.	
•	 Short introduction to toxicology (i.e. MAC, LD50, LCt50, structure and properties). 
•	 Dual use of substances.
•	 Synthesis, analysis, protection, treatment, and destruction of chemical weapons.
•	 The life of Fritz Haber (1868-1934). This famous German chemist invented the synthesis of ammonia (Nobel 
Prize for Chemistry, 1918). He was also the ‘father’ of German chemical warfare during the First World War 
(1914-1918). Was he a benefactor of mankind as well as a war criminal?
Guest	lecture	by	a	police	officer	and	a	demonstration	of	the	use	of	CS	gas.
 
Biology
Let the student read and analyse an article from a magazine for physicians on The Working and Effects of Nerve Gases, 
Preventive Health Measures and the Treatment of Casualties.
History and Law
 
Topics:
•	 The use of chemical weapons in the past.
•	 Halabja (1988), Tokyo (1995) and Syria (2013).
•	 The development of international laws. 
•	 The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW).
Classroom role-play about an imaginary country considering the production of chemical weapons.
Ethics
 
Topics:
•	 The	scientific	freedom	of	chemists:	What	can	be	studied?	What	can	be	published?
•	 The responsibility of chemists for the application of their inventions.
•	 Ethical dilemmas of chemists (in times of war, terrorist threats etc.). 
•	 Under what conditions is it acceptable for chemists to work for military purposes? 
•	 The social responsibility of chemists.
•	 Chemistry for peace.
•	 Do chemists need a moral code?
Literature and Arts
Classroom discussion, drama, role-playing, creative writing etc in response to:
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An Example from Pakistan:  
SASSI University
By Maria Sultan
The South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University is a degree-awarding institution dedicated to promoting peace and 
stability in South Asia. Its work is focused on strategic 
stability in the South Asian region, and thus on the 
emergent nuclear relationship which is at the heart of 
that stability.
The Institute takes a multi-disciplinary approach aimed at 
bringing together various streams of thought from across 
the social and natural sciences, policy-makers as well as 
the academia. It aims to make a leading contribution to 
regional and international academic and policy-orientated 
research discourses about the South Asian security.
The primary thrust of the work carried out by the Institute 
revolves around the nuclear questions and debates relating 
to non-proliferation and disarmament, with a particular focus 
on	finding	ways	and	means	 to	enhance	capacity	building	
within and outside the region.
However, the Institute’s remit goes beyond nuclear stability 
to include the wider issues of chemical and biological 
weapons, conventional force balance, civil-military relations, 
social and political stability, religious extremism, and the 
disputed territory of Kashmir, which inform the nature of 
security and stability in the South Asian security complex, 
and thus impact on the nuclear relationship. In addition, the 
Institute hopes to expand its research on issues such as 
energy politics in the South and South West Asian region.
SASSI has been granted the status of a degree-awarding 
university pursuant to Act No. VI of 2013, approved by the 
National Assembly of Pakistan on 13 March 2013. The aim, 
purpose and objectives of the university are to promote and 
disseminate knowledge, training, research and development 
in	the	fields	of	social	science,	natural	sciences	and	emerging	
technologies. With this aim, the SASSI University plans to 
launch its premier programmes, as follows:
•	 BS in International Security 
•	 Bs	and	Ms	in	Peace	and	Conflict	Studies
•	 Bsc and Msc in Aviation Sciences 
•	 Bsc and Msc in Mineral Sciences 
•	 Bs and Ms in Media Studies 
•	 Bs and MS in Counter-terrorism and Intelligence 
Studies.
•	 Bsc and MSc in Nuclear Power Policy
•	 Training	 modules	 and	 certificate	 courses	 in	 Arms	
Control And Disarmament
•	Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
•	Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT)
The programmes are developed with the aim to equip the 
country’s youth with techniques and skill sets of international 
standards, and the knowledge base necessary for the future 
leaders and as a vanguard of Pakistan’s advancement 
within the international community as a 21st-century state. 
The programmes will also include multiple courses and 
independent	 training	 modules	 and	 certificate	 courses	 in	
arms control and disarmament. These programs will include 
training courses on the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC), which aim to inform, advocate and educate the 
participants on CWC implementation and related issues. It 
will lead to the effective implementation of the CWC and 
serve as a stabilizing factor for peace.
The SASSI University aims to organize a two-week intensive 
course on the Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) to 
•	 Poems on the atrocities of the First World War (for instance, Dulce et Decorum Est and Anthem for Doomed 
Youth, the famous poems by Wilfred Owen, or Counter Attack and Other Poems by Siegfried Sassoon. Useful 
anthologies of war poems are: The Penguin Book of First World War Poetry (1996), Minds at War. Poetry and 
Experience of the First World War (ed. David Roberts; Saxon Books, 1996), and the most recent one, We Are 
The Dead. Poems and Paintings from the Great War 1914 – 1918. (Red Horse Press 2012). 
•	 The novel All Quiet on the Western Front (Im Westen nichts Neues) by Erich Maria Remarque
•	 The novel Under Fire (Le Feu) by Henri Barbusse.
•	 A selection of political cartoons from the First World War.
•	 Fifty-one etchings called The War (Der Krieg), including Storm Troopers Advancing Under Gas (Sturmtruppen 
rücken im Gas vor), by Otto Dix. The cycle of prints was modelled after Goya’s famous The Disasters of War. 
•	 The painting Gassed by John Singer Sargent. 
•	 The drawings of Christ with Gas Mask (Christus mit der Gasmaske) by Georg Grosz. 
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be held in Islamabad (Pakistan). The central theme behind 
this endeavour is to increase the awareness and stimulate 
understanding of the Treaty in order to promote its entry into 
force and universalization.
The	 Peace	 and	 Conflict	 Studies	 programme	 aims	 to	
familiarize students with the manner in which peace and 
conflict-resolution	skills	are	developed	for	local,	national	and	
international crisis situations. It aims to develop among the 
students the ability to apply an inter-disciplinary approach 
to the study of state-related problems and suggest viable 
solutions for crisis management. 
The SASSI University’s Nuclear Power Policy degree 
programme is a cross-disciplinary approach designed to 
educate and train students so that they can contribute as 
nuclear	power	policy	experts	and	professionals	in	the	field	of	
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The ultimate goal 
of the programme is to promote policy-making to develop 
governmental infrastructure, nuclear regulators to conduct 
regulatory activities, and policy experts to deal with nuclear 
power policy matters.
In addition, other faculties are also being developed which 
include Bsc and Msc degrees in Aviation Sciences, Bsc and 
Msc degrees in Mineral Sciences, Bsc and Msc degrees in 
Media Studies, Bsc and MSc degrees in Counter-terrorism 
and Intelligence Studies. 
 New Publications
International Chemical Review 
The International Chemical Review (ICWR) is due to be 
published to highlight the success, the challenges and the 
emerging context for the CWC and its effectiveness as a 
stabilizer of international peace. The ICWR aims to inform 
civil society, policy experts and academia about the CWC, 
focusing on areas related to the CWC, which would directly 
support the Convention’s objectives and will help in CWC 
implementation and achievement of universality.
The edition will also review the risk posed by various 
microorganisms, as biological weapons need to be 
evaluated, the historical development and use of biological 
agents, and the role of the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention in eliminating such weapons.
The primary focus will be to increase awareness in technical 
experts, the media, and international organizations about 
the achievements by Pakistani scientists and engineers 
in	 the	 nuclear	 industry	 during	 the	 last	 five	 decades,	 and	
about open markets for new trade and investments by 
mainstreaming	the	benefits	of	CWC.
Pique	International	Defense	Review
SASSI University in collaboration with Pique has launched 
the	first	volume	of	“Pique	International	Defense	Review”	in	
November 2013. The magazine aims to enhance awareness 
among the general population regarding Pakistan’s defence 
capabilities, and military strength and constraints in the 
security complex. The publication is a compilation of articles 
written by prominent defence scholars and experts. The 
magazine focuses on regional and international events. In 
addition SASSI University has regular publications such as 
SASSI Research Reports, Research Papers, Policy Briefs 
and Technical Briefs.
Connect with OPCW Social Media
www.facebook.com/opcwonline www.twitter.com/opcw
www.youtube.com/opcwonline www.flickr.com/opcw
www.gplus.to/opcw
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Case Studies: International organisations
Facilitating and supporting synergy 
and collaboration between international 
organisations
By Elena Sokova and Daniel Feakes
In recent years, several international organisations working on disarmament and non-proliferation issues have	undertaken	significant	education	and	outreach	
activities.	Some	of	these	are	described	in	the	subsequent	
articles	 in	 this	 section.	 	 Last	month,	 for	 the	 first	 time,	
more than two dozen relevant international organisations 
and other key stakeholders gathered together in order to 
capture the experiences and lessons learned.
The International Workshop on Disarmament and Non-
Proliferation Education and Capacity Development was 
held in Vienna on 14 and 15 November 2013 at the Vienna 
Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP). 
The event was co-organized by the VCDNP and the OPCW, 
with the support of and in partnership with the Foreign and 
Commonwealth	Office	 of	 the	United	Kingdom,	 the	 Federal	
Ministry for European and International Affairs of Austria, 
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization 
(CTBTO), the Permanent Mission of Norway to the 
International Organizations in Vienna, and the Carnegie 
Corporation of New York.
The workshop in Vienna brought together practitioners in 
the	 field	 of	 disarmament	 and	 non-proliferation	 education,	
particularly from international organizations, as well as 
experts from selected leading academic centres and 
professional networks. This broad range of professionals 
shared experiences and best practices—particularly 
with	 regard	 to	 specific	 tools	 and	 methods—and	 explored	
potential collaboration and synergies between international 
organizations and other key stakeholders in the areas of 
disarmament and non-proliferation education and training, 
awareness-raising, and outreach. 
In his keynote speech, Dr. Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary 
of the CTBTO, emphasized the universal importance of 
disarmament and non-proliferation, arguing that all members 
of the global community must be engaged in such initiatives. 
Dr. Zerbo asserted that disarmament and non-proliferation 
education issues should be taught as part of the global 
framework, not independent of it, and that international 
organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
and academia must work together through integrated and 
synergistic training and capacity building.
Opening remarks were also given by Mr. Attila Zimonyi, 
Director of Strategy and Policy at the OPCW and by Mr. 
Cornel Feruta, Chief Coordinator in the International Atomic 
Energy	Agency	Director	General’s	Office	for	Coordination.	
Participating organizations and experts then provided 
brief overviews of the relevant work being done by their 
respective organizations. The workshop also featured 
several panels, providing more in-depth information 
about the work of the participating organizations as 
well	 as	 detailed	 information	 on	 specific	 tools,	 methods	
and practices. Active discussions followed the panels, 
including information on organization’s programmes, how 
the programmes are implemented, and rationales for 
selecting methods or tools.
Key issues
Participants underlined that disarmament and non-
proliferation education and training efforts should be 
tailored to different types of audiences (such as for 
age, profession, educational background, country and 
region), as well as different levels of technical expertise, 
generations and learning preferences, and even technical 
capabilities. 
The audiences of the educational programmes presented 
at the workshop varied widely, including primary and high 
school students and teachers, university undergraduate 
and graduate students and faculty, professionals, trainers, 
scientists, journalists, lawmakers, and diplomats.
The importance of framing the issues of disarmament and 
non-proliferation to maximize interest and acceptance 
was discussed, including suggestions of framing them as 
either a component of human or environmental security, 
or of responsible conduct of science. By framing the issue 
as one of responsible conduct of science, education and 
training could reach broader audiences of scientists, as 
well as be included earlier in a student’s curriculum. 
Many participants asserted that education on responsible 
conduct of science should be taught in every university 
science course, to ensure that scientists understand the 
potential dual-use nature of their work.
It	was	also	noted	that	many	artificial	barriers	exist	regarding	
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disarmament and non-proliferation education between the 
main chemical, biological, and nuclear regimes.
Currently there are few educational resources developed 
or available for educators and trainers to holistically cover 
all disarmament and non-proliferation issues. Participants 
specifically	 spoke	 of	 the	 challenge	 to	 overcome	 the	
invisible “silos” that exist, separating chemical-, biological-, 
and nuclear-focused organizations, including international 
organizations.
Identifying a set of core competencies or functional 
competencies common to these three areas could be a 
first	 step.	Participants	 commended	 the	 important	 role	 of	
partnerships	between	national	and	international	scientific	
organizations, national academies of sciences, and 
international organizations, particularly in chemical and 
biological weapons disarmament and non-proliferation 
education. Examples include the OPCW’s partnership 
with the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry 
(IUPAC), and the relationship of the Biological Weapons 
Convention and the Biosecurity Working Group of The 
Global Network of Science Academies (IAP).
Programme and message sustainability pose challenges. 
Many of the attendees expressed concern that educational 
initiatives, to be truly successful, must be continuing 
in order to have a long-term impact. Both the need to 
pursue engagement with former course participants, and 
the need to institutionalize programmes were discussed, 
including better use of the train-the-trainer approach, as 
well as networking opportunities among and between 
existing student/faculty networks. Participants pointed to 
the success in creating sustained education through the 
Model United Nations format as an example that could be 
followed.
Educational tools and methods were discussed by 
participants as both a challenge and a solution, with the 
challenge being learning how to use the new tools and 
methods and employ them. These include online delivery 
of content and courses, active learning techniques, 
immersive training, and simulations. Many participants 
were eager to learn more about the tools and methods 
already employed by other disarmament and non-
proliferation education programmes, with the hope that 
increased sharing in such tools would preclude the need 
to “reinvent the wheel”.
Workshop recommendations
In response to the many challenges and solutions 
discussed, participants made numerous recommendations 
for next steps to improve disarmament and non-proliferation 
education and training in the following three domains: 
•	 Improvement and increase of contacts and 
communication among relevant organizations, 
including international organizations, non-governmental 
organizations, and academia;
•	 Increased project cooperation to maximize 
efficiencies,	decrease	duplication	of	efforts,	and	avoid	
gaps;
•	 Raising	 the	 profile	 of	 disarmament	 and	 non-
proliferation education.
For additional information and a full report of the workshop, 
readers can visit http://www.vcdnp.org/131125_np_
education_workshop_report.htm.
Ms. Sokova is the Executive Director of the Vienna Center 
for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. Prior to coming 
to Vienna, she was the Assistant Director of the James 
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the 
Monterey Institute of International Studies. Her primary 
research interests are focused on international non-
proliferation and nuclear security mechanisms, nuclear 
materials management, nuclear fuel cycle, trafficking in 
nuclear and radioactive materials, international nuclear 
safeguards, and non-proliferation education and training. 
She has published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, the 
Nonproliferation Review, the International Herald Tribune 
and other periodicals.
 
2002 United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education
Education and training are fundamental to continuing global progress on disarmament and non-proliferation, as pointed 
out in the United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education (A/57/124). According to this study, 
“[t]he overall objective of disarmament and non-proliferation education and training is to impart knowledge and skills to 
individuals to empower them to make their contribution, as national and world citizens, to the achievement of concrete 
disarmament and non-proliferation measures and the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective 
international control.” 
Although progress has been made in the implementation of the 34 recommendations to “promote education and training 
in disarmament and non-proliferation at all levels of formal and informal education” contained in the 2002 United Nations 
study, workshop participants pointed out that several recommendations have not been implemented at all, while many 
have considerable room for further progress. All recommendations of the study continue to remain relevant. More infor-
mation, resources and teaching materials can be found at www.un.org/disarmament/education.
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Outreach Through Education for the Entry Into 
Force of the  Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty
By Jean du Preez
“I know that I know nothing”. One of the most famous	 quotations	 of	 Socrates	 recognises	 the	importance of knowledge, education, and self-
awareness. Wisdom is being conscious of what 
the mind can achieve, and accepting doubts as a 
challenge, rather than a limitation. 
Countering the current threats to the international security 
environment must be seen as a challenge to be met, 
rather than as a limitation of humankind’s ability to act. In 
meeting these challenges, education is the best tool that 
the international community has 
available to spread the principles 
of peace and prosperity. Therefore, 
outreach through education can 
contribute to a broader consensus 
around the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), 
and promote its entry into force 
and universality. Enhancing 
understanding of the Treaty’s 
underlying value, its contribution to 
international peace and security, 
and	 the	 civil	 and	 scientific	benefits	
of	its	verification	regime,	stimulates	
progress towards its entry into force 
and universalisation. 
A technical treaty with a political purpose
The CTBT prohibits nuclear tests by anyone anywhere, and 
is	underpinned	by	a	science-based	verification	regime.	The	
Treaty’s International Monitoring System and International 
Data Centre collect and analyse data that is distributed to 
all 183 States Signatories in a truly democratic and non-
discriminatory way. With the CTBT, all States can verify the 
absence of nuclear testing. Yet, 17 years after its opening 
for signature, the Treaty has not entered into force. 
The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization promotes the 
remaining	ratifications,	in	particular	by	the	eight	Annex	II	
States that need to join the Treaty in order for it to become 
international law. In this context, education and training 
are essential tools. Over the years, the Preparatory 
Commission has used both “deep” and “broad” training 
to instruct thousands of individuals, thereby developing 
capacity	 in	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	Treaty	 and	 its	 verification	
system. The deep training approach, also referred to 
as capacity building, consists of focused and intensive 
technical training for individuals from States Signatories, 
working directly with the assets and infrastructure 
that	 comprise	 the	 Treaty’s	 verification	 system.	 Broad	
education and outreach, launched in 2010 in the context 
of the Capacity Development Initiative (CDI), engage 
a wider spectrum of stakeholders, including diplomats, 
academia, think tanks, journalists, and other members 
of civil society, on the legal, political and technical 
underpinnings of the Treaty and its multilaterally 
established	verification	system.	
New	educational	techniques	
Multidisciplinary courses and 
immersive teaching methods are the 
key characteristics of the Commission’s 
educational activities. The Commission 
has organised tailor-made courses, 
calling on in-house expertise, as well 
as internationally-renowned guest 
lecturers and panellists. Pursuing a 
multi-track approach, the Commission 
has offered CTBT policy and science 
courses, as well as training for UN 
Disarmament Fellows, enrolling 
almost 2,500 participants and issuing 
almost	1,000	certificates	of	successful	
completion since 2010. 
All lecture courses are supported by a comprehensive 
e-learning platform, which hosts open online modules, live-
streaming, video archives, quizzes, discussion forums, a 
peer-assessed assignment mechanism, and additional 
resources. The platform serves as a one stop shop for 
all CTBT-related information, and establishes a network 
of current and future CTBT experts. For more information 
see www.ctbto.org/specials/ctbto-education-resources.
In an effort to reach out to a larger audience, participants 
can take part in the courses virtually, through the 
e-learning platform, without having to travel to Vienna. By 
using distance and blended learning methodologies, the 
Commission has embraced the myriad of tools available 
in the information age. Currently, the platform hosts 
CTBT	 Tutorials	 available	 in	 all	 official	 UN	 languages,	
plus Portuguese, as well as interactive, self-paced 
online modules covering the basics of the Treaty and its 
verification	regime.	The	Commission	also	has	a	presence	
on	iTunes	U	(University),	with	over	350	files	available	for	
download.  (See www.ctbto.org/itunesu)
Executive Council Simulation – Partici-
pants in the 2013 CTBT Diplomacy and 
Public Policy Course simulating a CTBTO 
Executive Council deliberation on an on-
site inspection request
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The Commission also offers interactive simulations as a 
part of the learning experience. For instance, participants 
of the 2013 Diplomacy and Public Policy Course, and the 
2013 UN Disarmament Fellows Course were involved in 
a simulation replicating the Executive Council decision-
making process on an on-site inspection request submitted 
by a Member State. This hands-on experience makes the 
CTBT	verification	system	more	understandable	and	allows	
the participants to put theoretical knowledge into practice.
To make this outreach through training sustainable in the 
long run, the Commission works together with universities, 
and non-governmental and international organizations to 
develop and promote CTBT education beyond the live 
lecture courses, and empower academic institutions to 
help build capacity in their own countries and regions. 
Universities are encouraged to develop their own CTBT 
courses or to incorporate CTBT themes into pre-existing 
courses, supported by CDI e-learning and resources. 
Promoting the CTBT through education
The Commission is committed to investing in the 
human infrastructure of its Member States through the 
involvement of broader communities in its education and 
training activities, thereby strengthening the international 
consensus around the Treaty, raising awareness about 
the Commission’s work and laying the groundwork for 
the Treaty’s entry into force and universalisation. It is 
noteworthy	that	participants	from	five	of	the	top	ten	most	
represented countries come from the non-ratifying Annex 2 
States: China, India, Iran, Pakistan, and the United States 
of America, while nearly half of registered participants 
were from developing countries. Looking at 2014 and 
beyond, the Commission will continue its outreach through 
education in an integrated capacity-building approach by 
exploring synergies with other international organizations, 
and streamlining training activities.
Jean du Preez is Chief of External Relations, Protocol and 
International Cooperation at the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (Preparatory Commission) 
in Vienna. He is a former professor for non-proliferation 
studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies 
where he also directed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Arms Control Project at the Institute’s James Martin Center 
for Nonproliferation Studies. Before joining the Monterey 
Institute in 2002, Mr du Preez was a South African diplomat 
for 17 years, during which time he dealt with disarmament, 
non-proliferation and arms control matters and also served 
on the South African Council for the Non-Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Networking for Nuclear Security: The International 
Nuclear Security Education Network
By Jason Harris
One of the biggest challenges presented by the global nuclear energy revival is maintaining effective security wherever nuclear or other 
radioactive material is in use, storage, and/or transport, 
and of associated facilities, especially in countries/
regions with a heightened security risk. Achieving 
this	 goal	 will	 require	 adequate	 infrastructure,	 the	
correct	 equipment,	 sufficient	 resources,	 and	 –	most	
importantly	 –	 trained	and	motivated	personnel	 at	 all	
levels. 
This need for human resource development in nuclear 
security was underlined at several International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conferences and Board of 
Governors’ Meetings. Successive IAEA Nuclear Security 
Plans, the most recent of which was agreed by the Board of 
Governors in September 2013, give high priority to assisting 
States in establishing educational programmes in nuclear 
security, in order to ensure the sustainability of nuclear 
security improvements. The current Nuclear Security 
Plan covering 2014-2017, emphasises the importance of 
considering existing capacities at international, regional, 
and national levels when designing nuclear security 
academic programmes.
The International Nuclear Security Education Network 
(INSEN) was established in 2010, during an IAEA 
workshop, by a group of experts from academia, 
international organizations, and professional nuclear 
material	management	associations.	INSEN	is	defined	as	a	
partnership between the IAEA, educational and research 
institutions, and competent authorities. 
The INSEN mission is to promote excellence in nuclear 
security	 education	 in	 pursuit	 of	 the	 identified	 need	 for	
highly	 qualified	 nuclear	 security	 professionals.	 INSEN’s	
objectives are to promote among universities and 
other educational institutions worldwide, the recently-
developed IAEA Nuclear Security Series No 12 (NSS-
12) – Educational Programme in Nuclear Security. 
This sets out a model for a Nuclear Security Master of 
Science curriculum by (1) assisting in the development 
of comprehensive and up-to-date educational materials; 
(2) assisting in the development of faculty members in 
the area of nuclear security; and (3) promoting nuclear 
education and professional careers in nuclear security 
as a means of attracting the best and the brightest into 
the discipline. The work required to accomplish these 
objectives is performed by three separate working groups 
(WGs) established within INSEN.
In a period of only three years, INSEN members have 
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completed a number of course materials and textbooks 
to be used in conjunction with the Master of Science 
Programme in Nuclear Security as outlined in NSS-12. 
Textbooks have been completed or are under review for the 
following courses: NS-1: Introduction to nuclear security; 
NS-3: Nuclear energy, nuclear fuel cycle, and nuclear 
applications; NS-4: Methods and instruments for nuclear 
and other radioactive 
material measurement; 
NS-8: Physical protection 
technologies and 
equipment; NS-9: Security 
of nuclear and other 
radioactive material in 
transport; and NS-22: IT/
Cyber security.  In addition, 
teaching material has been 
developed for these and 
other courses.  
In conjunction with the 
development of course 
material, university faculty 
and leadership level 
practitioners have been 
participating in a number of 
INSEN sponsored courses. 
Since 2011, four courses 
on the “Introduction to 
Nuclear Security” have been delivered at King’s College 
London. Three “International Schools on Nuclear Security” 
have been held in Trieste, Italy and two “Schools on IT/
Cybersecurity” have been held in Germany (Institute 
for Security and Safety (ISS) at Brandenburg University 
of Applied Sciences). With the support of the IAEA, the 
European Commission, and the US Department of State, 
other courses have also been offered in such places as 
South Africa, the United Kingdom, and Morocco. INSEN 
members have presented nuclear security education 
topics at dozens of conferences and meetings throughout 
the world.  
The culmination of activities by all the working groups has 
led to the development of a European M.Sc. in Nuclear 
Security. The programme is administered by Delft University 
of	Technology	 in	 the	Netherlands,	with	support	 from	five	
other universities: the University of Oslo, the Technical 
University of Vienna, the Brandenburg University of Applied 
Sciences,	 the	 National	 Centre	 of	 Scientific	 Research	
“Demokritos” in Greece, and the Dalton Nuclear Institute 
at the University of Manchester. The Masters in Nuclear 
Security aims at delivering nuclear security managers 
capable	 of	 finding	 synergy	 in	 thinking	 between	 hazard-
risks, security methodology, and corporate governance 
at strategic and tactical 
organisational level. The 
programme commenced in 
April 2013 and will run for 
almost two years.
Currently there are 90 
members of INSEN, 
representing 76 institutions 
(mainly universities) from 
38 IAEA member states, 10 
international organisations, 
and 4 observers.  In the 
near future, the goals of 
INSEN	 include	 finishing	
additional textbooks and 
educational materials, 
completing additional 
professional development 
courses, aligning more 
closely with initiatives in 
nuclear security training, 
and increasing the membership, especially in areas 
with little current participation. 
For more information about INSEN, please contact the 
IAEA at nsnstraining@iaea.org.
Dr. Jason T. Harris is currently Associate Professor 
at Idaho State University (ISU) in the Department of 
Nuclear Engineering and Health Physics and holds a joint 
appointment with the Idaho National Laboratory. He is 
also the Chair of the IAEA International Nuclear Security 
Education Network (INSEN). He also serves on the 
advisory board for the European MSc in Nuclear Security 
and the Mountain West Nuclear Science and Education 
Consortium (focusing on nuclear non-proliferation and 
security studies) and is a mentor and consultant for the 
US Department of State Partnership for Nuclear Security 
(PNS).
Participants at a “Train-the-Trainers Workshop on Nuclear Secu-
rity”, held in Kenitra, Morocco in May, 2013 which was organ-
ized by Professors Jason Harris and Oum Keltoum Hakam, INSEN 
members (Chair and Working Group Vice-Chair, respectively), and 
sponsored by the US Department of State Partnership for Nuclear 
Security. It was attended by over 100 individuals representing 
government, industry, NGOs, and academia.  More than half of the 
participants were students from northern African universities.
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Education and Outreach Activities within the  
Biological Weapons Convention
By Jamie Revill
Following the collapse of the negotiations to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 2001, States Parties to the Convention 
have embarked upon an exploration of alternative 
means and methods of enhancing the Convention and 
reinforcing the norm against biological weapons. 
These intersessional process meetings have proved 
unexpectedly fruitful in looking at a number of new and 
novel issue areas, but particularly in stimulating discussion, 
common understanding and, to a lesser extent, effective 
action regarding previously unexplored – or at least 
underexplored – issues of awareness raising, codes of 
conduct, education, and outreach. 
Such topics have, in one form or another, appeared on 
successive intersessional process agendas, beginning with 
the discussion on codes of conduct for scientists in 2005.1 
Whilst markedly different to the more traditional focus of 
biological disarmament diplomacy, such discussions have 
nonetheless proved useful in light of the changing context in 
which the BWC is situated. 
Indeed, changes in the capacity and geography of life 
science research, combined with the implications of the 
evolving security environment, necessitate that biological 
disarmament diplomacy expand its focus from being 
primarily concerned with preventing the emergence of 
major offensive state biological weapons programmes, to 
incorporating consideration of the more complex challenge 
of managing dual use research across the globe. 
Such a process of management requires a number of 
different actions at a number of different levels: “from the 
international to the individual”.2  However, one essential 
element of this process is outreach and building relations 
with those in the life science community, as well as 
informing those working within the life sciences of the 
biosecurity related concerns of the security community, 
and the legal and normative measures that underpin the 
prohibition on biological weapons. 
Communities of practice are rarely homogenous or 
monolithic, and caricaturing scientist and security actors 
as such is can be counter-productive. Nonetheless, 
there are some generalizable differences in the 
priorities and interests of these actors. In this regard, 
outreach serves to build constructive relations between 
two different communities of practice focused on two 
different issue areas, those of science and security. As 
with most relationships, it takes time and effort to make 
progress. 
Nonetheless, building relations in times of relative stability 
ensures a valuable ‘deep water anchor’ in science and 
security relations during times of turbulence. 
There are a number of examples of outreach initiatives 
that have taken various forms, from ‘biosecurity caravans’ 
to biology for peace brochures,3  but perhaps the most 
remarkable is the work of the FBI in acting as a matchmaker 
between academia and security, and bringing these two 
collectives of actors together.4 This approach, which has 
built on lessons learned in the past, has the added advantage 
of establishing a more sustainable relationship between the 
two communities through which to address emerging issues 
related to dual use, but also other legal or criminal issues 
that could arise in relation to life science research. 
Education, as Brian Rappert has noted, serves several 
possible functions;5  however, key amongst its objectives 
is providing scientists with the capacity to recognize  – and 
respond  in a more informed manner – to dual use challenges. 
A number of initiatives have been undertaken to this end 
and these have largely focused on academics, particularly 
students working in the life sciences, as part of an effort 
to build a sustainable biosecurity culture in the future. For 
example, there have been a number of regional or national 
surveys of the academic curricula that provide an indicator 
of the extent of, and attitudes to, biosecurity and dual use 
issues in academia.6  Additionally, there have also been 
several national efforts to develop and deliver biosecurity 
educational materials for university students;7  including 
in some cases through train-the-trainer programmes or 
distance learning initiatives intended to build capacity in this 
area.8  
Consistent with the no-one-size-fits-all approach to the 
implementation of the BWC, the content and delivery of 
dual use education programmes need to be tailored to 
suit the linguistic and cultural context in which they are 
being delivered. Moreover, education need not solely 
consist of more lectures or ‘death by PowerPoint’, 
but rather should be the institutionalisation of ethical 
deliberation in the life sciences.9  As such there are a 
number of more ‘active learning’ techniques that could 
perhaps more effectively stimulate thinking around 
issues of dual use. For example, the US National 
Academies of Science have conducted a series of 
training exercises in the Middle East and North Africa 
region that have employed active learning techniques, 
such as ‘role play exercises’10 that force individuals to 
operate in the shoes of other actors and explore the 
perspectives of other communities.  
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Whilst there has, thus, been some progress in relation 
to education and outreach within the BWC, a number of 
challenges remain. Many in the life science community 
have different priorities and speak a different language to 
counterparts working on security issues. It is also possible 
that they operate on the basis of different types of evidence, 
placing great weight on the empirical than the speculative, 
which	is	a	factor	that	perhaps	makes	it	difficult	to	appreciate	
the concerns of the security community. 
Moreover, the idea that one needs to be ‘educated’, alongside 
concerns over the implications for freedom of research, 
understandably generates a degree of sensitivity amongst 
those	 within	 the	 scientific	 community.	 Such	 sensitivities	
suggest that future activities should seek to ‘incentivise and 
engage	the	scientific	community	as	part	of	the	solution,	not	
as part of the problem’11,  and make professional training 
in safety, security, and ethics an embedded part of both 
the academic curriculum and the professional training of 
scientists. Achieving this will not provide a silver bullet to deal 
with the challenge of dual use biology, but it could provide a 
better foundation for reinforcing the regime against biological 
weapons, and build a platform for constructive engagement 
in the future.
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